Page:2020-06-09 PSI Staff Report - Threats to U.S. Communications Networks.pdf/95

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In 2012, Team Telecom proactively engaged ComNet. After ComNet alerted Team Telecom about a corporate restructuring of its parent company,[1] a DHS official sent ComNet written inquiries and deliverable requests.[2] The requests sought information related to ComNet's (1) technical architecture; (2) security policies and standards; (3) governance controls for its U.S. facility; (4) law enforcement point of contact; (5) operational and IT auditing; and (6) other confirmations relating to the requirements outlined in the 2009 security agreement.[3] ComNet provided this information.[4] Officials informed the Subcommittee that Team Telecom determined no further action was required, as nothing ComNet provided suggested non-compliance with the terms of the security agreement.[5] In 2013, Team Telecom again asked for a "brief, up-to-date company overview."[6]

For approximately five years after signing the security agreement with ComNet, Team Telecom relied on these written representations as to ComNet's compliance with the 2009 security agreement. Although one official explained that Team Telecom generally waited to visit the offices of Chinese carriers with existing Section 214 authorizations during consideration of China Mobile USA's application,[7] Team Telecom conducted a site visit to ComNet's offices in February 2014.[8] A memo summarizing the 2014 visit suggests that the meeting may have been prompted by CITIC's application for Section 214 authority.[9] That application was referred to Team Telecom for review, and "in light of the pre-existing agreement with [Pacific Networks] and ComNet, [Team Telecom] determined a visit to . . . ComNet's domestic facility to be in order."[10]

Team Telecom met with representatives from ComNet and CITIC to discuss ComNet's corporate structure, telecommunications infrastructure, security policies and procedures, and law enforcement processes.[11] ComNet generally noted that no


  1. DHS00159PSI-60; DHS00176PSI-77.
  2. Cf. DHS00178PSI-81 (referencing a July 23, 2012 email from Team Telecom requesting particular deliverables) (attachments omitted).
  3. Id.
  4. DHS00178PSI-311.
  5. Email from the Dep't of Homeland Sec. to the Subcommittee (June 4, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  6. See In the Matter of Pacific Networks Corp. and ComNet (USA) LLC, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-111, at Exhibit K (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=710677&f_number=ITC2142009042400199 (Letter from Bruce Olcott, Counsel to ComNet & Pacific Networks, to Hunter Deeley, Foreign Investment Review Staff, Nat'l Sec. Div., Dep't of Justice (Oct. 10, 2013)).
  7. Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020).
  8. DHS00460PSI-465. Although not a party to the 2009 security agreement, a representative from the Department of Defense's Chief Information Office also attended the site visit. See id. at DHS00460PSI.
  9. Id. at DHS00461PSI.
  10. Id.
  11. See generally DHS00460PSI-65.

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