early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn V or the newer U.S. Space Launch System to support proposed crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.
In addition to land-based launches, in 2019, the PRC demonstrated the ability to launch a Long March-11 (LM-11) SLV from a sea-based platform. Since 2021, the PRC has been expanding its sea launch infrastructure near Haiyang to expand the frequency of sea launch missions. This capability, if staged correctly, would allow the PRC to launch nearer to the equator than its land-based launch sites, increase the rocket’s carrying capacity, and potentially lower launch costs.
The PRC has developed quick-response SLVs to increase its attractiveness as a commercial small satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could support PRC military operations during a conflict or civilian response to disasters. Compared with medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite launch campaigns because they are transportable via road or rail and can be stored launch-ready with solid fuel for longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. Because their size is limited, quick-response SLVs such as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 are only able to launch relatively small payloads of up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO.
The expansion of non-state-owned PRC launch vehicle and satellite operation companies in China’s domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is successfully advancing military-civil fusion efforts. Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these entities and obfuscates the end users of acquired foreign technology and expertise.
Space Situational Awareness. The PRC has a robust network of space surveillance sensors capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow the PRC to support its missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning (BMEW), spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring.
Electronic Warfare Counterspace Capabilities. The PLA considers EW capabilities to be critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates in its exercises jamming and anti-jamming techniques that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and precision-guided munitions employment. The PRC probably is developing jammers dedicated to targeting SAR, including aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any potential conflict involving the United States or its allies. In addition, China probably is developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequency bands, including military-protected extremely high frequency communications.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). During the past two decades, PRC defense research has proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite components. The PRC has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
