- probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival.
The PRC’s commingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces during peacetime and ambiguities in its NFU conditions could complicate deterrence and escalation management during a conflict. If a comingled PRC missile launch is not readily identifiable as a conventional missile or nuclear missile, it may not be clear what the PRC launched until it detonates. Furthermore, potential adversary attacks against China’s conventional missile force-associated C2 centers could inadvertently degrade China’s nuclear C2 and generate nuclear use-or-lose the pressure to use weapons before they are targeted. Once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of mobile missile systems to hide sites could further complicate the task of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional forces and, thus, increase the potential for inadvertent attacks on the nuclear forces. PRC leadership calculus for responding to conventional attacks on nuclear forces remains a key unknown.
Readiness. The PLA Rocket Force uses a set of operational procedures to keep part of its force at heightened readiness during peacetime, according to PLA documents and media reporting. PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty” which includes assigning a missile battalion to be ready to rapidly launch. Further, a new generation of silo-based ICBMs are beginning to enter the force and they will probably be operating under China’s developing “Early Warning Counterstrike” (预警反击) posture (the PLA term for launch on warning), enabling a rapid responsive nuclear strike. This readiness posture allows the Rocket Force to maintain a portion of its units on a heightened state of readiness while leaving the other portion in peacetime status with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.
The PLA also probably has an orderly, pre-planned series of “combat readiness level” steps that govern the increases in the readiness of its forces from peacetime to wartime combat operations. This process probably allows the PLA to transition most, perhaps all, of its nuclear missile force from its current peacetime status to full combat readiness in order to respond to possible contingencies.
Land-Based Platforms. The PRC’s land-based nuclear force primarily consists of ICBMs with different basing modes complimented by theater-range road-mobile systems. The PRC has approximately 350 ICBMs in its arsenal, all of which can reach CONUS.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
