PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States would use low-yield weapons against its Taiwan invasion fleet, with related commentary in official media calling for proportionate response capabilities. The DF-26 is the PRC’s first nuclear-capable missile system that can conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most likely weapon system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near-term.
PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in the warzone, for warning and deterrence. Additional PRC military writings as of 2017 noted that while strategic nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with high hit precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war. Such discussions provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, suggesting PRC nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear war is uncontrollable.
Launch on Warning (LOW). The PLA is implementing a LOW posture, called “early warning counterstrike” (预警反击), where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple manned C2 organs are involved in this process, warned by space and ground based sensors, and that this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and LOW responses.
The PRC’s considerations to attain a LOW posture date back to even the 1970s and 1980s, when the PRC considered using existing land-based ballistic missile early warning radar to support a LOW posture for its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs, but apparently this early warning system was unreliable. In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed to support a LOW posture. The PRC has several ground-based large phase array radars—similar in appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars—that could support a missile early warning role. There has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well. In 2013, foreign media sources claimed to be in possession of PLA documents indicating expedited plans to field three geostationary satellites capable of detecting ballistic missile launches. Then, in 2015, the PRC’s defense white paper identified “improved strategic early warning” as specific nuclear force modernization goals with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) reported including requirements to place early warning satellites in space. As of 2022, the PRC likely has at least three early warning satellites in orbit. In 2019, President Putin of Russia stated that Russia is aiding the PRC in developing a ballistic missile early warning system.
Despite these developments, the PRC has called upon other states to abandon similar launch-on-warning postures to enhance strategic stability while declining to engage in substantive dialogue on risk reduction. The PRC seems to believe a LOW posture is consistent with its no first use policy, given that it involves a retaliatory strike that takes place after warning of an inbound first attack from an adversary. At the same time, PRC military writings note that command and control systems – which would include early warning systems—can be a source of accidental nuclear war.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
