objects. But he is also somewhat vacillating on this last point, which is an after-effect of the scholastic studies of his youth.
Criticism of this most rationalistic of all systems of philosophy must first of all be directed against the central proposition of the homogeneity (or really identity) of cause and effect. Should this proposition prove untenable or even be incapable of consistent elaboration, it must follow that, in the last analysis, Being is not, as Spinoza believed, absolutely rational. We shall find this problem discussed by the English empiricists and by the critical philosophers.
d. Spinoza teaches, in harmony with this theory of error, that every idea is regarded as true, so long as it is not supplanted by another. Our theory of reality is developed through the rivalry of ideas. The most comprehensive and most consistent theory is the truest.
Spinoza’s elaboration of the psychology of the emotions as given in his “Ethics” is unsurpassed in its excellence. Like Hobbes he starts from the impulse of self-preservation. But he bases it on the consistency of his system. The infinite Substance is actively present in every individual being (modus); the effort towards self-preservation of each individual being is therefore a part of the divine activity. Hence whenever effort is successful, it produces pleasure, and conversely pain. But this only occurs in case of a transition to a more perfect or less perfect state; an absolutely changeless state would neither give rise to pleasure nor pain.—The various emotional qualities result from the association of ideas. We love what produces pleasure, and hate what produces pain. We love whatever contributes to our love, and hate what constrains it. When a being similar to ourselves ex-
