free from fault. It is impossible for the Divine Nature to reveal itself in finite nature without encountering numerous obstacles and limitations. Suffering (“physical evil”) and sin (“moral evil”) are consequences of these obstacles (“metaphysical evil”).—This reminds us of the mythology of Jacob Böhme. Leibnitz must concede to Bayle that the world is governed by two principles, with this modification, namely, that he ascribes the one to the divine will, which reduces evil to a minimum, the other to the divine understanding, which determines the various possible world forms.
But these are not the only arguments which Leibnitz adduces. He cites the infinitude of the universe, as admitting the possibility that the evil which we experience in our part of the universe (which is perhaps the worst part!) may be insignificant as compared with the world as a whole. This argument is new. It had only become possible through the new world-theory of Copernicus and Bruno. On the other hand, Leibnitz employs an old argument when he says that evil and sin were necessary in order that the good and the beautiful might be rendered conspicuous by contrast. This view occurs already in Plotinus and Augustine. It is rather aesthetic than moral. And moreover the sacrifice of single parts of the universe, i.e. single Monads, for the good of others, conflicts with Leibnitz’ own theory.
Leibnitz bases his ethical ideas on the longing for perfection, i.e. for a higher degree of energy and greater spiritual harmony. The sense of pleasure is correlated with an abundance and harmony of energies. The individual is spontaneously impelled to strive not only for his own happiness, but likewise for the happiness of others. In the controversy between Bossuet and
