Chap. IV.
1. That Existence is a Perfection, verified from vulgar Instances. 2. Further proved from Metaphysical Principles. 3. An Appeal to ordinary Reason. 4. That at least Necessary Existence is a Perfection, if bare Existence be not. 5. An Illustration of that last Conclusion.
1. TO avoid the Necessity and Evidence of our Demonstration of the Existence of God drawn from the inseparable connexion of the Notion thereof with his idea (we urging That necessary Existence must needs he included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect) there are some that stick not to affirm that Existence is no Term of intrinsecal Perfection to any thing. For, say they, imagine two pieces of Gold equal in weight, purity and all other respects, but onely duration or necessity of Existence; we cannot justly, without being humoursome or phansiful, attribute preeminence to one more then to the other. To which I answer, That as two pieces of Gold are better then one, so one piece of Gold that will last twice as long as another is twice as good as the other, or at least much better then the other; which I think is so evident that it wants no further proof.
But further, that we may not onely apply our selves to answer Objections, but absolutely to ratifie the present Truth, That Existence is a Perfection: First, it is palpably plain, according to that sensible Aphorism of Solomon, Better is a living Dog then a dead Lion.
2. But then again to argue more generally. The Metaphysicians, as it is very well known, look upon Existence as the formal and actual part of a Being; and Form or Act is acknowledged the more noble and perfect Principle in every Essence; and therefore if they can be distinguished in God, is so there also: if they cannot, then it is thereby confest, that we cannot think of the Idea of God but it immediately informs us that he doth Exist. And I recommend it to the inquiry of the Hebrew Criticks, whether הוה, from whence is יהוה, does not rather signifie Existence then Essence.
3. Thirdly, let the Metaphysicians conclude what they please, it is evident to ordinary Reason, that if there be one conception better then another, that implies no imperfection in it, it must be cast upon what is most perfect: But Existence is better then non-existence, and implies no imperfection in it; therefore it must be cast upon an Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect.
4. But fourthly and lastly, Though it were possible to cavil at the single Notion of Existence, that it neither argued Perfection nor Imperfection, nor belong'd to either; yet there can be no shew of exception against the highest and most perfect manner of existing, but that that is naturally and undeniably included in the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect; and that therefore we do but rightfully contend that necessary Existence is inseparably contained in the notion of God.
