ject as Beauty is, or take any notice of the chief requisite in it, which is Symmetrie and concinnity of parts, or of any order of colours, but only of the colours themselves. And it is no wonder that as the sight of red stockings will inflame the Spirits of a Turky-cock with anger, as also the sight of the blood of grapes or mulberries provoke the Elephant to fight; so other fresh colours of sundry sorts may please and exhilarate the spirits of several Animals, as Light does of most. And therefore if the Horse prance and carry himself proudly when he has gay and glittering furniture, it is from no other reason then what we have already declared. And if a Dog bark at a ragged Beggar more then at a handsomly-clad Gentleman, it is to be inquired into, whether a Beggar's Curre will not bark more at a Gentleman then at a Beggar, the sense of Beauty neither pleasing nor provoking this Animal, but the unusualness of the Object stirring up his choler. And that Birds prune their feathers, is not any delight in decency and comeliness, but to rid themselves of that more uncouth and harsh sense they feel in their skins by the incomposure of their ruffled plumes. So for the choice of their Mates in either Birds or Beasts for copulation, it is very hard to prove that they are guided so much by sight as scent; and then if by sight, whether it he not colour rather then exact symmetry of parts that moves them.
And lastly, if we should admit at any time that Brutes may be more pleased with a beautiful Object (taking Beauty in the entire Notion thereof) then with one less beautiful, it is but a confused delight, nor do they any more relish it as Intellectual, then Children (that are ordinarily well pleased to see Geometrical instruments that are made of Brass or Ivory or such like materials) do the exact cuttings and carvings of the characters and lines thereof as they are rational and Mathematical. And therefore we may very well conclude, that the Beauty of bodies is naturally intended no more for Brutes then such Mathematical instruments for Children: but all such objects are directed to Creatures Intellectual from that Eternal Intellectual Principle that made them.
6. The third Objection is against Animals preying one upon another, and Man upon them all. For this, say they, is inconsistent with that Eternal Goodness that we profess to have created and ordered all things. To which I answer, That it is not at all inconsistent: For the nature of that Absolute Universal and Eternal Goodness is not to dote upon any one particular, as we do (whose complexions haply may make us more then ordinarily compassionate (though most men have too little of that natural Benignity) and whose short sight plungeth us too much into the sense of what is present) but taking a full and free view of the capacities of Happiness in such kinde of Creatures, contriv'd their condition to be such as was best for the generality of them, though the necessity and incompossibility of things would be sure to load some particular Creatures with greater inconveniency then the rest.
And therefore that several kindes of terrestrial Creatures more exactly might be happy in their animal nature, this Soveraign Goodness was content to let it be so, that ever and anon something that by the Animal sense would be necessarily accounted Tragical and miserable should light upon
