thing to reject the Being of God because he does not immediately fall under the Senses, as it were to reject the Being of Matter because it is so incomprehensible to the Phansy. 14. The factious Humour someness of the Atheist in siding with some Faculties of the Soul, and rejecting the rest, though equally competent judges.
1. And now verily casting my eyes upon the true Idea of God which we have found out, I seem to my self to have struck further into this business then I was aware of. For if this Idea or Notion of God be true, as I have undeniably proved, it is also undeniably true That he doth exist: For this Idea of God being no arbitrarious Figment taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural Emanation of the Minde of Man, if it signifies to us that the Notion and Nature of God implies in it necessary Existence, as we have shewn it does, unless we will wink against our own natural Light, we are without any further Scruple to acknowledge That God does exist.
2. Nor is it sufficient ground to diffide to the strength of this Argument, because our Phansy can shuffle in this Abater, viz. That indeed this Idea of God, supposing God did exist, shews us that his Existence is necessary, but it does not shew us that he doth necessarily exist. For he that answers thus, does not observe out of what prejudice he is enabled to make this Answer, which is this: He being accustomed to fancy the Nature or Notion of every thing else without Existence, and so ever easily separating Essence and Existence in them, here unawares he takes the same liberty, and divides Existence from that Essence to which Existence it self is essential. And that's the witty Fallacy his unwariness has intangled him in.
3. Again, when as we contend that the true Idea of God represents him as a Being necessarily existent, and therefore that he does exist; and you to avoid the edge of the Argument reply, If he did at all exist; by this answer you involve your self in a manifest Contradiction. For first, you say with us, That the Nature of God is such, that in its very Notion it implies its Necessary Existence; and then again you unsay it, by intimating that notwithstanding this true Idea and Notion, God may not exist; and so acknowledge that what is absolutely necessary according to the free Emanation of our Faculties, yet may be otherwise; Which is a palpable Contradiction as much as respects us and our Faculties, and we have nothing more inward and immediate then these to steer our selves by.
4. And to make this yet plainer at least, if not stronger; when we say that the Existence of God is Necessary, we are to take notice that Necessity is a Logical Term, and signifies so firm a Connexion betwixt the Subject and Prædicate (as they call them) that it is impossible that they should be dissevered, or should not hold together; and therefore if they be affirm'd one of the other, that they make Axioma Necessarium, an Axiome that is necessary, or eternally true. Wherefore there being a Necessary Connexion betwixt God and Existence, this Axiome, God does Exist, is an Axiome Necessarily and Eternally true. Which we shall yet more clearlyunder-
