298 HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book II.
A.D. 1672. obtained a formal recognition of liis title of rajali, and, in addition U) the re- covery of a large portion of liis old territory', obtained the grant of a new jag- hire in Berar. He was thas at liberty to turn his arms against Bejapoor and Golconda, both of which, unwilling to risk a contest, submitted to the humilia- tion of paying tribute. An interval of tranquillity followed, and Sevajee turned it to good account, by introducing many important internal reform.s, and organ- izing, with much skill and success, a regular form both of military and civil government.
Gameofcraft The new arrangement made between Sevajee and the Moguls was not sin-
between
Auruiigzebe ccrc ou either side. Aurangzebe only pretended friendship that he might once evajee. ^^^^^ obtain possessiou of Sevajee's person, and thus save the necessity of the protracted war which must be carried on, in order to subdue him by force of arms. A game of craft was accordingly played for some time, but so little to Aurungzebe's advantage, that he at last threw off the mask and declared open hostilities. Sevajee, so far from declining the contest, took the first active step by attacking and re-capturing his hill -fort of Singvu-h. Other forts, together with the territories annexed to them, were also recovered ; and, in 1 670, after again plimdering Sxirat, he retired along the left bank of the Taptee into Can- deish, where he set the example, for the first time, of levying chout — a kind of permanent black-mail, for which the Mahrattas afterwards became notorious, and which amoxmted to no less than one-fourth of the annual revenue. Hea'y and odious as the exaction was, many districts readily submitted to pay it, in return for the exemption which it gave them from the other forms of Mah- ratta plunder.
sevajees Sevajec's rapid successes were greatly favoured by Aurungzebe's suspicious
success.
temper and persecuting bigotry. Ever afraid that his sons might treat liim as he had treated his own father, he never intrusted them with any important command, without sharing it with some other oflicer who might be able to neutralize any treasonable attempts. His war in the Deccan was carried on on this principle, and hence Prince Moazzim was not only crippled in his move- ments, but obliged to divide his forces so as to expose them to the danger of being beaten in detail. In 1671, Aurungzebe, under the influence of this suspi- cious spirit, left Moazzim without reinforcements, but at the same time sent Mohabat Khan to act independent of him, with an army of 40,000 men. Thus circumstanced, neither commander was able to cope with the enemy ; and, after a few unimportant operations, the rainy season coming on. obliged both to retire into quarters. When the season for resuming operations commenced, Mohabat Khan, whUe eagerly prosecuting a siege, left 20,000 of his men exposed to the attack of a large army which Sevajee had raised. They were, in conse- Firfit ^eat queucc, Completely defeated. In this battle, which was fought in 1 672, the tiie Mah- Mahrattas were for the first time successful against the Moguls in fair conflict in the open field. As may be supposed, the moral influence of the actory was
rattos.
