+'>f! HISTORY OF INDIA. [Book III
AD 17.W, prediitoiy uiid other followers to the number of 200,000. In artillerj', an ann of war which the Mahrattas had at la.st learned to piize, he was amply provided, and was able, after suiTOunding his camp with a broad and deep ditch, to mount 200 guns for its defence. Ahmed's araiy consisted of about 40,000 Afghans and Persians, and 50,000 Indians, of whom 1 3,000 were cavalry. The armies were thas not unfairly matched. In respect of available troops they were nearly equal, while at the same time each laboured under a great disadvantage — the Bhao, in the excessive number of followers, who, without adding to his strength, hamjxired his movements and consumed his provisions; and Ahmed, in an artillery- .so defective that it barely mustered thirty pieces of various calibre, and, furni.shing no proper means of attack, compelled him to imitate the Bhao's example, and remain on the defensive. The battle Under such circumstances, time rather than prowess was to decide the
of Paiiiput.
struggle ; for neither leader felt disposed to force on an action so long as he could obtain subsistence for his army from the surrounding country^ At this mode of warfare the Mahrattas could not easily be surpassed, and their foraging parties at first found no difficulty in bringing in abundant supplies. Gradually, however, the Dooranees, by the rapidity and boldness of their movements, made foraging so dangerous, that the Bhao, threatened with famine, saw the peiil of his position, and attempted to escape from it by proposing negotiation. Ahmed, whose supplies had also begun to fail, was urged by his Indian allies to come to terms or risk a decisive action; but his constant answer was — "This is a matter of war with which you are not acquainted In other affairs do as you please, but leave this to me." He was aware of the straits to wdiich his enemies were I'educed; and, even after they had begun in a kind of desperation to make vigorous attacks upon his lines, seemed more inclined than ever to confine himself to skirmishing, in which he usually had the advantage. He was well aware of the crisis which was approaching, and fully prepared to profit by it. The Bhao's supplies were completely exhausted ; and after a last efibrt at foraging which proved utterly mavailing, becoming convinced that he could no longer maintain his position, he yielded to the urgency of his soldiers, and, with many prognostications of disaster, issued orders for a general attack. It was made with the utmost impetuosity, and so long as it was directed against the Rohillas and other Indian allies of Ahmed, seemed iiTesistible. Tlie Dooranee chief endeavoured to rally the fugitives, but finding it impossible, ordered his own men to advance. This at once changed the fortune of the day. By a dexterous movement, while the main body attacked in front, a di^dsion wheeled round to Defeat of the the flank, and the whole Mahratta army, panic-struck by this double onset, ttmied
Mahrattas.
their backs and fled. As no quarter was given, the slaughter was fearful. About 200,000 are said to have fallen. Among the slain were the Peishwa's son Wiswas Rao, the Bhao, recognized only by what was supposed to be his headless trunk, and many other great Mahratta chiefs. The dream of a Mali-
