42G HISTOilY OF INDIA. [Book III.
AD. 1748. north at the sea-shore, and was carried round, for above five miles, in a regular curve, by the west and south, till it reached in the latter direction the river of Ariancoopan. This hedge, impenetrable to cavalry, and not easily to be paased even by infantry, fonned, with the river, which fell into the sea a mile and a half below, a complete line of defence. So carefully had this object been attended to, that at each of the openings made in the hedge for the four road« which led from the town to the surrounding country, there was a redouhtt mounted with cannon, and near the point where the hedge joined the river a small fort bearing the same name had been erected.
Owing to the time which had been lost on the outward voyage, partly by contrary winds and partly by the injudicious attempt on the Mauritius, the season was far advanced when tlie besiegers commenced operations. Every day, therefore, was of the utmost consequence, and not an hour ought to have been spent, except upon some object which would contribute essentially to a suc-
Deiay bef,)ie ccssful rcsult. Unfortunatcly a very different principle of action was adopted,
Fort Ariau- -in t ^
coopau. and the troops, instead of proceeding at once to Pondicherry, stopped short at the fort of Ariancoopan. From a very extraordinary neglect on the part of the authorities of Fort St. David, no means had been used, though the fleet had long been expected, to obtain such accurate information as would be needed when the siege should commence. Hence, when Ariancoopan was approached, no person could be found to give any accurate description of its works or its garrison. An engineer sent to reconnoitre, was afraid to go near enough to make the necessary observations, and represented it as a place of no strength, though covered by an entrenchment, while a deserter reported that it was defended only by 100 sepoys. This information was inaccurate, for the fort was a triangle, regularly fortified, and suiTOunded by a deep dry ditch, full of pitfalls, and the garrison consisted of 100 Em'opeans and 300 sepoys, under an active European officer. Admiral Boscawen, thus grossly misled, ordered an immediate assault. It was made with the greatest bravery, but with the most disastrous results. The storming party persisted, from mere shame, after they saw that success was impossible, and did not retire tiU 150 of theii" number were struck down by musketry and gTape-shot, and Major Goodere, the most experienced officer of the king's troops, was mortally wounded.
Timewasted. Tliis was an ominous commencement, but the next step taken was still more reprehensible. When it was seen that the fort possessed greater means of resist- ance than had been imagined, there was no necessity for remaining before it. A small detachment would have sufficed to watch it, and prevent any danger that could have arisen from its being left behind. All this was overlooked, and the siege of Pondicheny was postponed till this paltiy place could be forced to yield. The French were too skilful not to profit by the egi'egious blunder, and by holding the fort as long as possible, gained the incalculable advantage of stopping the entire progress of the besiegers dmmg eighteen days. Even at last
