CiiAr. IX.] SUEAJAH DOWLAH. 537
The letter which filled the nabob with so much rage, and whs the ostensible a.d. 1756. cause of his abandoning the expedition to Purneah, was received by him at Rajamahal on the 17th of May, and though his intention then announced was never revoked, and he from that day continued his march southwards, evidently Applications bent on mischief, the 7th of June arrived before the fiist note of alarm was Dutch and despatched to Madras and Bombay. The passage by sea, as the south monsoon '^'"' ' was then blowing, was impossible, and an overland message could not be carijed in less than thirty days. It was therefore evident that long before any answer could be received tlie nabob would have ample time to do his worst. Conscious of the desperate predicament in which they were thus placed, the presidency . • applied to the Dutch at Chinsurah, and tlie French at Chandernagore, and endeavoured to persuade them that they ought to unite their forces as in a com- mon danger. The former simply refused — the latter, as if in mockery, proposed that they should abandon Calcutta, and place themselves a ith their effects under their protection. What that protection would have been may be infeiTed from the fact that the nabob in passing Chandernagore was pi opitiated by a present of 200 barrels of gunpowder. The presidency, now tin own entirely on their own resources, began to display some activity. Works ( f defence, such as the shortness of the time would admit, were erected, provisions were laid in, and the number of Indian matchlock-men was augmented to 1500. The regular garrison consisted of 2G4 men, and the inhabitants enrolled as militia amounted to 250, forming an aggi-egate of 51 -i, but of these two-thirds were topasses, Armenians, and Portuguese, on whom no reliance could be placed, and of the remaining third, mustering in all 174, not more than ten had seen service.
With such feeble resources a successful defence was more than doubtful, and The fort of
^ c ^ • c • (» 1 • Tanna
therefore the attention of the presidency was, first of all, directed to the means tivkcn .md
of escape. On the opposite side of the river Hooghly, about five miles below
Calcutta, the native fort of Tanna, mounting thirteen guns, commanded the
narrowest part of the channel. The necessity of secuinng this fort, so as to give a
free outlet to the sea, seemed so in-gent, that it was determined, while the nabob
was only advancing, to assume the offensive and endeavour to gain possession of
it. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th of June, two vessels of 300 tons, and
two brigantines anchored before it, and opened a fire which at once dislodged
the garrison, consisting of not more than fifty men. A party immediately
landed, spiked some of the guns, and threw the rest into the river. If it was
intended to retain the fort, the true plan would have been not to destroy the
guns but point them so as to repel any attack on the land side. The mistake
was soon apparent, for the very next day a detachment of the enemy, 2000 strong,
arrived from Hooghly, drove the few Europeans and lascars within the fort id
their boats, and resisting any attempt to dislodge them by a cannonade, obliged
the ships to weigh anclior and return to Calcutta.
The same day when the ships sailed against Tanna a letter was intercepted, Vol. I. 68
