"HAP. X.] ATTACK ON CHANDERNAGOKE. 561
t ) keep up a respectable force in tliis province for the future.' If so, it follows a.d. 1757. as an obvious inference that, in treating with such princes, obligations written or verbal are in themselves worthless, and that, to give them any value, they ought always to be accompanied with a material guarantee, which would operate as a penalty in the event of their being violated. It will be seen that Clive at a later period of his career both saw this necessity and acted upon it.
Next to peace with the nabob, the object nearest Clives heart was the rrei)ai-ation.. destruction of the French interest in Bengal. It seemed to follow from the terms ciianuer of the offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies, that the nabob could no longer continue to give any countenance to the French ; and therefore, on the very day when the alliance was ratified, Clive told Omichund to sound iiim on the subject, and endeavour to obtain his consent to an attack on Chander- nagore. He detested the very idea, and with good reason, for not only did the revenue gain considerably by the French trade, but good policy dictated that the rival companies might be employed as mutual checks on each other, and prevent the danger to which the native government might be exposed, if one of them were allowed to gain an entire ascendency. The nabob therefore made no secret of his unwillingness to withdraw his protection from the French ; but as he only temporized, and did not expressly prohibit the attack, Clive deter- mined to carry it into effect. With this view, on the 18th of February, he •Tossed the river with his troops, a few miles above Calcutta. The French had no difficulty in penetrating his design, and immediately claimed the nabob's protection. Their messengers found him on his return homewards at Auga- deep, about forty miles south of Moorshedabad ; and having succeeded in con- vincing him that their destruction would endanger his own safety, induced him to write a letter, peremptorily forbidding the attack. Not satisfied with thus interfering in their behalf, he made them a pre.sent of 100,000 rupees, gave orders to Nimcomar, now governor of Hooghlj', directly to assist them if his prohibition was disregarded, and even made preparations for sending back Meer Jaffier, with half his army, to encamp at Chandernagore. On seeing the nabob thus decided, Clive made a merit of necessity, and, in conjunction with Admiral Watson, gave both verbal and wi'itten assurances that the nabob's wishes in the matter would be strictly attended to, and that the attack would not be made without his sanction. As it thus appeared that the French were not to be crushed by violence, the next best thing was to secure their neutrality; and with this view, not only were negotiations resumed, but a treaty was
actually drawn up, and only waited to be signed when at the last moment a
I demur took place. The French commissioners, when the question was put to them, admitted that they were acting only in their own name, and could not bind the government of Pondicherry. Though it must be admitted that a treaty made under such circumstances would have been futile, the conduct of the British was not ingenuous. It is difficult to believe that they were not from Vol. I. 71
