6.3 i
llItiTOKy Ol' INDIA.
[B«^oK Hi,
I
A.D. 1700.
Ci>ote captures Villenore.
Lilly's disappoint- v.iant.
signed, all the Mysoreans went away, {promising a Hpeedy return with their whole force and abundance of provisions. They were even better than tlieir word; for they not only arrived, but gained a victory by the way. Their f«.>rce, consisting of 1000 horse, 1000 sepoys, and 200 Europeans or topasses of the French army, witii eight pieces of cannon, had arrived within sight of Trivadi, when they were encountered by Major Moore, who had gone to intercept them at the head of 180 European infantry, 50 huasars, 1000 black hoi-se, and 1100 sepoys. The manifest inferiority of numbers should have made Moore paase before risking a battle ; but either because he was not in a condition to refase it, or from over- confidence, he attempted to stand liis ground, and owing to some unexplained mischance or misconduct, sustained a disgraceful and total defeat The Mysoreans were afterwards allowed to proceed without inten-uption, and on their arrival at Pondicherry were received with a long salute of cannon. They deserved it ; for, besides the troops, they brought, what was justly deemed ntjt less important, 3000 l^uUocks, carrying their baggage and drawing their artillery, and 3000 more laden with rice and other provisions.
When Moore met with the above disaster, Coote was encamped with his army at the foot of the hill of Perimbd, preparing for the siege of Villenore, a fort about five miles W.S.W. of Pondicherry, and now the only serious obstacle to the complete investment of it. Believing that Lally, as soon as the Mysoreans arrived, would make every effort to save this fort, he proceeded, with that happ}' union of enterprise and caution which charactei'ized all his movements, to strengthen his position by a redoubt and several retrenchments judiciously selected, so as both to protect his army in the event of an attack by superior numbers, and furnish a basis for offensive operations. His precautions were not unnecessary ; for after the Mysoreans arrived, Lally, detennined to lose no time in relieving Villenore, set out for that purpose at the head of the whole forces he could muster. His numbers were far superior to the British, and he had every prospect of compelling Coote either to raise the siege of the fort, or risk an action under vmfavourable circumstances in order to maintain it. Lally s bad fortune still attended him. The garrison, though few in numbers, and threatened every moment "with assault, might easily have stood out for two days. The commandant thought otherwise, and hung out a flag of truce, which was instantly followed by surrender. The event took both armies equally by sur- prise, but of course produced very different sensations. Coote, successful at the very moment when he least expected it, declared that during the whole course of his career he had never been so fortunate. Lally, who had arrived within cannon-shot, was horror-sti-uck when he saw the British flag flying on the ramparts, and hastened back to seek the protection of the guns of Aiiancoopan. Coote, shortly after the capture of Villenore, having been reinforced by 700 of the nabob's force, and 500 of his cavalry, marched up to the bound hedge with almost all his native troops, but without any Europeans. His object was to tr}" the
