0(50 IIISTOKY OF INDIA. [Book III.
A.u. i75!i. The invasion of the sliazada had scarcely been defeated, when an ahtrni of an unexpected, though not less threatening description arose from a very difien-nt
nutcii ann;i (quarter. The Dutch had beheld tiie iJritish successes in Bengal with envy and
to Bengal ap])reliension. The French factories had been annihilated. Was it not [Kjssible tiiat theirs might share a similar fate? It is true that while the British and JJutch were at peace, this could hardly happen by open violence ; but the .same thing might be accomplished by underhand means. The danger to which an important branch of the Dutch trade had recently been expo.sed by the establish- ment of a saltpetre monopoly in favour of the English Company, was a case in j)oint. Others of a similar nature might be expected to follow, and therefore the true policy was to place their settlement on a footing which would command respect, or if necessary enforce it. There is some inconsistency in the motives
Its objects, by which the Dutch are said to have been actuated. According to one account, they had refused to recognize the revolution which had given the naboVj.ship of Bengal to Meer Jaffier, and, fearing his vengeance, determined to prepare a force which would enable them to defy it. According to another account, they had come to an understanding with Meer Jaffier, and with his sanction fitted out an armament which, arriving at a time when the English Company's troops had been diminished by the expedition to the Northern Circars, would enable him to shake iiimself free of the yoke which they had imposed upon him. It is impossible to decide between the conflicting motives thus attributed to the Dutch. The only important question for Clive, was to decide on the course which ought to be pursued when the armament should make its appearance. He had early made up his mind to repel it at all hazards, though he was well aware how difficult it would be to justify the proceeding. When remonstrated with by some of his friends on the responsibility he would incur by opposing the passage of the armament of a friendly power up the Ganges, he answered that " a public man may occasionally be called upon to act with a halter round his neck." On this principle he was prepared to act, but he was careful at the same time not to omit any precaution which might, ostensibly at least, place him in the right and the Dutch in the wrong.
ciiveapre Tlic nabob, even if he had given his sanction to the Dutch armament, was
paratioiis to . . ~, . .
opiwsB it. not prepared to avow it, and Clive therefore had little difficulty m procuring from him an order " to oppose and prevent any foreign troops being brought into his country.' This order the treaty made with the nabob bound him to obey; and hence, in opposing the Dutch, he could now assert that he w^as acting, not in his own name, but in that of the Bengal government. This was an important point gained, for it had the effect of depriving the Dutch of the character of allies, in which they desired to appear, and exhibiting them in that of aggressors. Accordingly, when their first ship carrying a body of troops arrived, they were obliged to pretend that Negapatam was her destined port, and that having been driven from it by stress of weather, she would again leave the Hooghlj- as soon
