THUCYDIDES AS A HISTORIAN 197 the effect of the Syracusan superiority in cavalry, both for scouting and foraging and in actual engagements. It was cavalry that won Chaeronea for Philip, and the empire of Darius for Alexander. He points out, too, the weakest spot of all in Greek strategy, the hampering of the general's action in the field by excessive control at home. The Sicilian Expedition was lost, not by Nikias, but by the Athenian Assembly ; or if Nikias also made grave errors, they were largely due to the state of para- lysing subjection in which he was kept by that absent body. The Roman Senate, composed so largely of mili- tary men, was as sympathetic to its generals' failures as it was to their extortions. The Athenian Assembly was largely affected by the private soldier and the man, who, though liable to serve, was in reality no soldier at all. Sparta was almost as bad for a different reason. Only an exceptional position like that of Brasidas in Chalcidice, or Agis at Dekeleia, enabled a general to act with real freedom,^ though even Agis was materially hindered by jealousy. Here again we see one of the secrets of the power of Philip and Alexander. Like most thoughtful soldiers — Bauer ^ quotes parallels from Moltke and others — Thucydides is consistently impressed with the uncertainty of war, the impossibility of foreseeing everything, or of knowing in a battle what exactly is being done. He does not judge men, as the stupid do, by their success. He had personal reasons, of course, for not doing so in military matters ; but this principle, one of the greatest marks of the real thinker, is with him all through his work. Pericles was convinced from the facts before him that Athens would win the war ; and she lost it. Pericles was profound and correct
- viii. 5, Agis. '^ Philologus, 1. 401.
