of liberty, I may affirm, that however opposite they appear in words to one another, and how much soever some of them seem to maintain another notion of liberty; yet at the bottom, there is an almost universal agreement in the notion defended by me, and all that they say, when examin’d, will be found to amount to no more.
2. Secondly, when I affirm necessity; I contend only for what is call’d moral necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determin’d by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity. And here also I have the concurrence of almost all the greatest Asserters of liberty, who either expressly maintain moral necessity, or the thing signified by those words.
3. Thirdly, I have undertaken to shew, that the notions I advance, are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality and laws, and of rewards and punishments in society;and
