influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But in truth, the ideas and images in men’s minds, are the Invisible Powers that constantly govern them, and to these they universally pay a ready submission.”[1]
2. The second action of man is judging of propositions. All propositions must appear to me either self-evident, or evident from proof, or probable, or improbable, or doubtful, or false. Now these various appearances of propositions to me, being founded on my capacity, and the degree of light propositions stand in to me, I can no more change those appearances in me than I can change the idea of red raised in me. Nor can I judge contrary to those appearances, for what is judging of propositions but judging that propositions do appear as they do appear? which I cannot avoid doing, without lying to myself, which is impossible. If any man thinks he can judge a proposition, appearing to him evident, to be not evident; or a probable proposition to be more or less probable than it appears by the proofs to be; he knows not what he says, as he may see if he will define his words. The necessity of being determined by appearances was maintained by all the old philosophers, even by the academics or sceptics. Cicero says,[2] “You must take from a man his senses, if you take from him the power of assenting; for it is as necessary the mind should yield to what is clear, as that a scale hanging on a balance should sink with a weight laid on it. For as all living creatures cannot but desire what is agreeable to their natures, so they cannot but assent to what is clear. Wherefore, if those things whereof we dispute are true, it is to no purpose to speak of assent. For he who apprehends, or perceives anything, assents immediately.” Again, “assent not only precedes the practice of vice, but of virtue, the steady performance
