any of those actions. And here also we experience perfect Necessity. If we will thinking or deliberating on a subject, or will reading, or walking, or riding, we find we must do those actions, unless some external impediment, as an apoplexy, or some intervening cause, hinders us; and then we are as much necessitated to let an action alone, as we are to act according to our will, had no such external impediment to action happened. If also we change our wills after we have begun any of these actions, we find we necessarily leave off these actions and follow the new will or choice. And this was Aristotle’s sense of such actions of man. “As,” says he, “in arguing we necessarily assent to the inference or conclusion drawn from premises, so if that arguing relate to practice, we necessarily act upon such inference or conclusion. As, for example, when we argue thus, whatever is sweet, is to be tasted, this is sweet; he who infers, therefore, this ought to be tasted, necessarily tastes that sweet thing if there be no obstacle to hinder him.”[1]
For a conclusion of this argument from experience, let us compare the actions of inferior, intelligent, and sensible agents, and those of men together. It is allowed that beasts are necessary agents, and yet there is no perceivable difference between their actions and the actions of men, from whence they should be deemed necessary and men free agents. Sheep, for example, are supposed to be necessary agents, when they stand still, lie down, go slow or fast, turn to the right or left, skip, as they are differently affected in their minds; when they are doubtful or deliberate which way to take; when they eat or drink more or less according to their humor, or as they like the water or the pasture; when they choose the sweetest and best pasture; when they choose among pastures that are indifferent or alike; when they copulate; when they are fickle or steadfast in their amours; when they
- ↑ Ethica, l. 7, c. 5, ap. Opera Edit. Par, vol. ii., p. 88, etc.
