ing from the use of his passions, appetites, senses, and reason; and if he suspends his choice of an object, that is presented to him by any of these powers as agreeable; it is because he doubts or examines whether upon the whole the object would make him happy, and because he would gratify all these powers in the best manner he is able, or at least such of these powers as he conceives tend most to his happiness. If he makes a choice which proves disagreeable, he gets thereby an experience which may qualify him to choose the next time with more satisfaction to himself. And thus wrong choices may turn to his advantage for the future. So that, at all times, and under all circumstances, he is pursuing and enjoying the greatest happiness which his condition will allow.
It may not be improper to observe that some of the pleasures he receives from objects are so far from being the effect of choice, that they are not the effect of the least premeditation, or any act of his own, as in finding a treasure on the road, or in receiving a legacy from a person unknown to him.
2. Secondly, this arbitrary[1] faculty would subject a man to more wrong choices, that if he was determined in his choice.
A man determined in his choice by the appearing nature of things, and the usage of his intellectual powers, never makes a wrong choice, but by mistaking the true relation of things to him. But a being, indifferent to all objects, and swayed by no motives in his choice of objects, chooses at a venture; and only makes a right choice when it happens (as the author justly expresses his notion) that he chooses an object, which he can by his creating power render so agreeable, as that it may be called a rightly chosen object. Nor can this faculty be improved by any experience: but must ever continue to choose at a venture, or as it happens. For if this faculty improves by experience,
- ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 147 to 150.
