being the certain effects of his immanent acts; and a chain of necessary fate must run through the whole order of things; and God himself then is no free being, but acts by a necessity of nature. And this necessity, to which God is thus subject, is, adds he, no absurdity to some. God is, according to them, necessarily just, true, and good, by an intrinsic Necessity that arises from his own infinite perfection. And from hence they have thought that since God acts by infinite wisdom and goodness, things could not have been otherwise than they are; for what is infinitely wise or good cannot be altered, or made either better or worse. And he concludes that he “must leave this difficulty without pretending to explain it, or answer the objections that arise against all the several ways by which divines have endeavored to resolve it.”
Again,[1] are not angels and other heavenly beings esteemed more perfect than men; because, having a clear insight into the nature of things, they are necessarily determined to judge right in relation to truth and falsehood, and to choose right in relation to good and evil, pleasure and pain; and also to act right in pursuance of their judgment and choice? And therefore would not man be more perfect than he is, if, by having a clear insight into the nature of things, he was necessarily determined to assent to truth only, to choose only such objects as would make him happy, and to act accordingly?
Further, is not man more perfect the more capable he is of conviction? And will he not be more capable of conviction if he be necessarily determined in his assent by what seems a reason to him, and necessarily determined in his several volitions by what seems good to him, than if he was indifferent to propositions, notwithstanding any reason for them, or was indifferent to any objects, notwithstanding they seemed good to him? for otherwise he could be
- ↑ Bramhall’s Works, p. 656 and 695.
