falletur præsciendo, errabit & agendo (quod est impossibile) aut nos agemus & agemur secumdum ipsius præscientiam & actionem.” And our learned Dr. South says[1], “the fore-knowledge of an event does certainly and necessarily infer that there must be such an event; forasmuch as the certainty of knowledge depends upon the certainty of the thing known. And in this sense it is that God’s decree and promise give a necessary existence to the thing decreed or promised, that is to say, they infer it by infallible consequence; so that it was as impossible for Christ not to rise from the dead, as it was for God absolutely to decree and promise a thing, and yet the thing not come to pass.”
I could also bring in the greatest divines and philosophers[2] who are assertors of Liberty, as confirming this argument; for[3] they acknowledge that they are unable to reconcile the [4] divine prescience and the Liberty of man together, which is all I intended to prove by this argument, taken from the consideration of the divine prescience.
Fifth argument, taken from the nature of Rewards and Punishments.
V. A fifth argument to prove man a necessary agent is as follows: If man was not a necessary agent, determined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation for rewards and punishments, which are the essential supports of society.[5]
For if men were not necessarily determined by pleasure and pain, or if pleasure and pain were no causes to determine men’s wills; of what use would be the prospect of rewards to frame a man’s will to the observation of the law, or punishments to hinder his trans-
