they will find far the greater part of the pretended assertors of Liberty to be real asserters of Necessity.
The Author’s notion of Liberty.
I shall conclude this discourse with observing that though I have contended that Liberty from Necessity is contrary to experience; that it is impossible; and if possible, that it is imperfection; that it is inconsistent with the divine perfections; and that it is subversive of laws and morality; yet to prevent all objections to me, founded on the equivocal use of the word Liberty, which, like other words employed in debates of consequence, has various meanings affixed to it, I think myself obliged to declare my opinion that I take man to have a truly valuable Liberty of another kind. He has a power to do as he wills or pleases. Thus, if he wills or pleases to speak, or be silent, to sit or stand, to ride or walk, to go this way or that way, to move fast or slow; or, in fine, if his will changes like a weathercock; he is able to do as he wills or pleases, unless prevented by some restraint or compulsion, as by being gagged, being under an acute pain, being forced out of his place, being confined, having convulsive motions, having lost the use of his limbs, or such-like causes.
He has also the same power in relation to the actions of his mind, as to those of his body. If he wills or pleases, he can think of this or that subject, stop short, or pursue his thoughts, deliberate, or defer deliberation, as he pleases, resolve or suspend his resolution as he pleases, unless prevented by pain, or a fit of an apoplexy, or some such intervening restraint or compulsion.
And is it not a great perfection in man to be able in relation both to his thoughts and actions, to do as he wills or pleases in all those cases of pleasure and interest? Nay, can a greater and more beneficial power in man be conceived than to be able to do as he wills or pleases? And can any other Liberty be conceived beneficial to him? Had he this power or Liberty in all things, he would be omnipotent!
