Omdurman was overrun by Abdullahi's spies, who, professing to be friendly towards the "Government," tried to wheedle out of known friends of the Government expressions of opinion as to the chances of success to the Mahdists' arms, and at the same time to ascertain the general feeling of the populace. Their favourite hunting-ground was of course the Saier, where the more influential people were incarcerated. From the persistence with which these spies pressed their inquiries as to the chances of success which might attend large bodies deserting to the Ingleezee under cover of darkness — their anxiety to learn how they might approach the camp without being fired upon before they had been given an opportunity of evidencing their peaceable intentions — we came to the conclusion that Abdullahi had been advised to make a night attack. Few knew better than we did what might. be the result of such a tactic. At close quarters the dervish horde was more than a match for the bestdrilled army in Europe. Swift and silent in their movements, covering the ground at four or five times the speed of trained troops, every man, when the moment of attack came, accustomed to fight independently of orders, lithe and supple, nimble as cats and as bloodthirsty as starving man-eating tigers, utterly regardless of their own lives, and capable of continuing stabbing and jabbing with spear and sword while carrying half a dozen wounds, any one of which would have put a European hors de combat — such were the 75,000 to 80,000 warriors which the Khaleefa had ready to attack the Sirdar's little army. Artillery,
