particular point, and carrying- that by an irresistible weight, to introduce confusion and defeat over the whole. He conceived various plans for this purpose: one was, to fall upon the rear vessels of the enemy, and endeavour to disable him, as it were; another and more splendid idea, was to direct the line of attacking vessels tl trough the line of those attacked; and, by doubling in upon the ships cut off, which of course must strike to so superior a force, reduce the strength of the enemy, and even subject the remaining ships to the risk of falling successively a prey, as they awkwardly endeavoured to beat up to the rescue of their companions. At the time when he was forming these speculations, the British arms suffered great depression, both by sea and land. A series of great and ill-directed efforts, if they had not exhausted, had so far impaired the strength and resources of the country, that neighbouring nations thought they had found a favourable opportunity for breaking the power, and humbling the pride of a formidable rival. In the naval rencounters which took place after France had joined
herself to America, the superiority of the British navy seemed almost to disappear; the naval armies of our enemies were every day gaining strength; the number and force of their ships were augmenting; the skill and experience of their seamen appeared to be coming nearer an equality with our own. All this was owing to the generous waste of strength which the British commanders had undergone in their gallant but vain attempts to come to a fair engagement with the enemy.
"Being fully satisfied," says Mr Playfair, "as to the principles of his system, Mr Clerk had begun to make it known to his friends so early as 1779. After the trial of admiral Keppell had brought the whole proceedings of the affair off Ushant before the public, Mr Clerk made some strictures on the action, which he put in writing, illustrating m by drawings and plans, containing sketches of what might have been attempted, if the attack had been regulated by other principles, and these he communicated to several naval officers, and to his friends both in Edinburgh and London. In the following year, [January, 1780] he visited London himself, and had many conferences with men connected with the navy, among whom he has mentioned Mr Atkinson, the particular friend of Sir George Rodney, the admiral who was now preparing to take the command of the fleet in the West Indies. A more direct channel of communication with admiral Rodney, was the late Sir Charles Douglas, who went out several months after the admiral, in order to serve as his captain, and did actually serve in that capacity in the memorable action of the 12th of April, 1782. Sir Charles, before leaving Britain, had many conversations with Mr Clerk on the subject of naval tactics, and before he sailed, was in complete possession of that system. Some of the conferences with Sir Charles were by appointment of the late Dr Blair of Westminster, and at one of these interviews were present Mr William and Mr James Adam, -with their nephew, the late lord chief commissioner for Scotland. Sir Charles had commanded the Stirling-Castle in Keppell's engagement; and Mr Clerk now communicated to him the whole of his strictures on that action, with the plans and demonstrations, on which the manner of the attack from the leeward was fully developed.
"The matter which Sir Charles seemed most unwilling to admit, was the advantage of the attack from that quarter ; and it was indeed the thing most inconsistent with the instructions given to all admirals.
"Lord Rodney himself, however, was more easily convinced, and in the action off Martinico, in April, 1780, the original plan seemed regulated by the principles of the Naval Tactics. * * * It was not till two years afterwards, in April, 1782, that lord Rodney gave the first example of completely breaking through the line of the enemy, and of the signal success which will
