on the 26th of June, and encamped about six miles from the French army. The next day their generals summoned Mr. Bussy, in the name of Salabad-jing, to surrender all his artillery, excepting the six field pieces which had brought from Pondicherry, and to relinquish the attributes of his Moorish dignities, promising on these conditions to let him proceed quietly to Masulipatnam. Mr. Bussy replies that he acknowledged the mandates of no man to disarm himself, and that he held his dignities from the Emperor, not from Salabad-jing. Messages of negotiation nevertheless continued.
On the 30th of June the lieutenant of Hussars went forth with half the troop to reconnoitre, and, being short sighted, led them without suspecting the danger into covered and unequal ground, where they were suddenly surrounded by a much superior number of Morattoes, issuing from the other side of a hill, who immediately attacked them on all sides. The Hussars, as is the custom of these troops in such emergencies, endeavoured to disperse, and each man to save himself as he best could: the rest of the troop in the camp seeing the danger of their comrades, mounted and galloped to their assistance, not in a compact body, to which the others might rally, but all singling out different antagonists; in which irregular manner of combat, the Morattoes themselves are equal to any horsemen in the world. The troop of French dragoons seeing the Hussars in flight, mounted and sallied to cover their retreat, but in regular order; and the Morattoes awed by their discipline quitted the fight, having killed the lieutenant and two Hussars, and desperately wounded twenty-seven others: they likewise took six horses; and sent away seven caps or hats which they had picked up on the field, as a trophy of their victory, to Salabad-jing. Their chiefs, elated by this success, proposed such extravagant terms, that Mr. Bussy, knowing they would become more arrogant the more sollicitude he shewed for peace, broke off the negociation abruptly, and consulted his officers on the future operations of the war.
He represented to them, that "defective as their force was in cavalry, it would scarcely be possible for the infantry and artillery alone to protect the long train of carriages required for the sick, baggage, stores, provisions, and ammunition, through a march of 200 miles
