including for the illegal use of personal data to influence the outcome of the elections[1]. In addition, it is urgent that Member States take the steps needed to preserve the integrity of their electoral systems and infrastructure and test them ahead of the European elections.
Disinformation campaigns, in particular by third countries, are often part of hybrid warfare[2], involving cyber-attacks and hacking of networks[3]. Evidence shows that foreign state actors are increasingly deploying disinformation strategies to influence societal debates, create divisions and interfere in democratic decision-making. These strategies target not only Member States but also partner countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood as well as in the Southern Neighbourhood, Middle East and Africa.
Disinformation produced and/or spread by Russian sources has been reported in the context of several elections and referenda in the EU[4]. Disinformation campaigns related to the war in Syria[5], to the downing of the MH-17 aircraft in the East of Ukraine[6] and to the use of chemical weapons in Salisbury attack[7] have been well documented.
2. DISINFORMATION: UNDERSTANDING THE THREATS AND STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE
Disinformation is an evolving threat which requires continuous efforts to address the relevant actors, vectors, tools, methods, prioritised targets and impact. Some forms, especially state-driven disinformation, are analysed by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, in cooperation with the Strategic Communication Task Forces of the European External Action Service and with the support of Member States' services.
The actors behind disinformation may be internal, within Member States, or external, including state (or government sponsored) and non-state actors. According to reports[8], more than 30 countries are using disinformation and influencing activities in different forms, including in their own countries. The use of disinformation by actors within Member States is an increasing source of concern across the Union. Cases of disinformation driven by non-state actors have also been reported in the Union, for example related to vaccination21[9]. As regards
- ↑ These sanctions are in addition to the ones provided by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679).
- ↑ Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, JOIN(2016) 18 final
- ↑ These cyberattacks may include targeted intrusions to collect sensitive information as a precursor to leaks or tainted leaks, take-over of social media accounts, social media accounts driven by bots, and disruption of information technology systems of, for instance, broadcasting companies or electoral commissions.
- ↑ See for example the report by the Policy Planning Staff and the Institute for Strategic Research of France: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf.
- ↑ Joint statement by 17 member countries of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on chemical attacks in Douma, Syria: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/manipulation-of-information/article/syria-chemical- attacks-in-douma-7-april-joint-statement-by-france-and-16-other.
- ↑ On the disinformation campaign on MH-17, see the East Strategic Communication Task Force: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/mh17-time-is-running-out-for-disinformation/ and https://euvsdisinfo.eu/flight-mh-17- three-years-on-getting-the-truth-out-of-eastern-ukraine/ as well as the statement from the Joint Investigation Team: https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@104053/reaction-jit-to/.
- ↑ https://euvsdisinfo.eu/timeline-how-russia-built-two-major-disinformation-campaigns/ On the Russian cyber operation targeting the OPCW in the Hague, see: https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/10/04/netherlands-defence-intelligence-and-security-service- disrupts-russian-cyber-operation-targeting-opcw.
- ↑ See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017.
- ↑ See COM(2018) 245 and COM(2018) 244
3
