EPISTLE LXVI.
succession of actions is woven, and a unity of life is created,—a unity which will proceed in a straight course. Reason, therefore, is the judge of good and evil; that which is foreign and external she regards as dross, and that which is neither good nor evil she judges as merely accessory, insignificant and trivial. For all her good resides in the soul.
36. But there are certain goods which reason regards as primary, to which she addresses herself purposely; these are, for example, victory, good children, and the welfare of one’s country. Certain others she regards as secondary; these become manifest only in adversity,—for example, equanimity in enduring severe illness or exile. Certain goods are indifferent; these are no more according to nature than contrary to nature, as, for example, a discreet gait and a sedate posture in a chair. For sitting is an act that is not less according to nature than standing or walking. 37. The two kinds of goods which are of a higher order are different; the primary are according to nature,—such as deriving joy from the dutiful behaviour of one’s children and from the well-being of one’s country. The secondary are contrary to nature,—such as fortitude in resisting torture or in enduring thirst when illness makes the vitals feverish. 38. “What then,” you say; “can anything that is contrary to nature be a good?” Of course not; but that in which this good takes its rise is sometimes contrary to nature. For being wounded, wasting away over a fire, being afflicted with bad health,—such things are contrary to nature; but it is in accordance with nature for a man to preserve an indomitable soul amid such distresses. 39. To explain my thought briefly, the material with which a good is concerned is sometimes contrary to nature,
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