Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/119

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USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Document: 304-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 119 of 150

34
Jill Pryor, J., dissenting
18-13592

corresponding to their gender identities. Unlike in Geduldig, no “benefits of the [policy] accrue to” transgender students. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.

Because the bathroom policy facially discriminates against transgender students, I next ask what implications that classification carries for the Equal Protection Clause—namely, what level of scrutiny is appropriate given the bathroom policy’s classification of transgender versus cisgender students.

2. The Bathroom Policy Contains a Sex-Based Classification, Triggering Heightened Scrutiny.

This case presents a cornucopia of different and sometimes overlapping theories for why the bathroom policy’s classification between transgender and cisgender students is a “sex-based classification.” Adams presents us with at least six theories.[1] The School District and the majority opinion rely on a seventh.[2]

Although the majority and I agree that heightened scrutiny applies to the bathroom policy, the majority opinion’s decision to


  1. Adams argues that heightened scrutiny applies because: (1) the policy cannot be stated without referencing sex-based classifications; (2) the bathroom policy excludes him on the basis of sex; (3) the bathroom policy relies on impermissible stereotypes; (4) the policy creates two classes of transgender students; (5) transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class; (6) even if the policy is not facially discriminatory, it deliberately targets and disparately impacts transgender individuals.
  2. The majority opinion and the School District contend that heightened scrutiny applies simply because the bathroom policy separates the two sexes.