Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/122

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USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Document: 304-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 122 of 150

18-13592
Jill Pryor, J., dissenting
37

“inextricably bound up with sex.” Id. In excluding Adams from a state-controlled space for a reason “inextricably bound up with sex,” the School District made a sex-based classification. See id.; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530–31 (finding that policy of excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute was a sex-based classification requiring the application of heightened scrutiny); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (concluding that policy of excluding men from nursing school required the application of heightened scrutiny). Heightened scrutiny applies because Adams’s exclusion from the boys’ restrooms at Nease was “based on sex” under Bostock’s logic.

ii. Heightened Scrutiny Applies Because Adams Is a Member of a Quasi-Suspect Class.

Adams also argues that his exclusion from the boys’ restrooms was “based on his transgender status.” Appellee’s En Banc Br. at 33. Here, Adams contends that transgender individuals form a quasi-suspect class.[1] When a state statute or policy makes a classification based on a “quasi-suspect class,” courts apply heightened scrutiny as we would for a sex-based classification. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–42.


  1. The majority says it does not address the quasi-suspect-class issue because the district court did not do so. Maj. Op. at 17–18 n.5. But we can affirm the district court’s decision that the Board’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause on any basis supported by the record. Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008).