Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/18

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USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Document: 304-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 18 of 150

18
Opinion of the Court
18-13592

subject to intermediate scrutiny.[1] To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the bathroom policy must (1) advance an important governmental objective and (2) be substantially related to that objective. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724. The bathroom policy clears both hurdles because the policy advances the important governmental objective of protecting students’ privacy in school bathrooms and does so in a manner substantially related to that objective.[2]


  1. The dissent separately asserts that intermediate scrutiny applies on the ground that there is “no doubt that Adams, as a transgender individual, is a member of a quasi-suspect class.” Jill Pryor Dis. Op. at 38. We have two responses. First, the dissent reaches this conclusion through a selective reading of the record, citing to exhibits and testimony where it sees fit. But the dissent fails to acknowledge that the district court did not address the issue, expressly stating that it had “no occasion to engage in the further analysis” as to whether “transgender people are a quasi-suspect class, deserving of heightened scrutiny per se.” Like the district court, we find no need to address the issue, given our conclusion that intermediate scrutiny applies, in any event. Second, and contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we have grave “doubt” that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rarely deemed a group a quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–46.
  2. Although we do not need to address whether Adams is “similarly situated” to biological boys in the School District for purposes of reviewing the bathroom policy under the Equal Protection Clause in the first instance, we note that there are serious questions as to whether Adams would meet this requirement. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. The promise of equal protection is limited to “keep[ing] governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10. When it comes to the bathroom policy, biological sex is the “relevant