USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Document: 304-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 47 of 150
“sex” to “gender identity” or “transgender status” is so important. Adams’s view of what constitutes “sex” for purposes of Title IX will have ramifications far beyond the bathroom door at a single high school in Ponte Vedra, Florida. This is because Title IX’s statutory carve-out from its general prohibition against sex discrimination applies to “living facilities,” not only bathrooms. 20 U.S.C. § 1686. And the same regulation that authorizes schools to provide separate bathrooms on the basis of sex also permits schools to provide separate “locker room … and shower facilities on the basis of sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. Therefore, affirming the district court’s order, and equating “sex” with “gender identity” or “transgender status” for purposes of Title IX, would, at the very least, generally impact living facilities, locker rooms, and showers, in addition to bathrooms, at schools across the country—affecting students in kindergarten through the post-graduate level.
For the same reason, affirming the district court’s order would have broad implications for sex-separated sports teams at institutions subject to Title IX, including public schools and public and private universities. While Title IX says nothing specifically about sports, its implementing regulations do. Those regulations, which necessarily flow from Title IX’s general prohibition against sex discrimination, mirror the blanket-rule-with-specific-exception framework that Title IX applies to living facilities. The
(quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17)). For these reasons, Adams’s contention lacks merit.
