USCA11 Case: 18-13592 Document: 304-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2022 Page: 68 of 150
administrative convenience is an insufficient justification for a gender-based classification.[1]
I
Intermediate scrutiny requires a showing that the challenged classification “serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The burden of justification is demanding,” and here it “rests entirely on” the School Board. Id.
In a number of cases applying intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has held that a gender-based regulation cannot be justified on the basis of administrative convenience. These cases are Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (“Decisions following Reed [v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)] … have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifications.”); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (where there is “no reason” to use “sex as a proxy for need,” “not even an administrative-convenience rationale exists to justify operating by generalization or proxy”); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins.
- ↑ The district court awarded Drew the same damages for both the equal protection claim and the Title IX claim, noting that the injuries arising out of these violations were “identical” and specifying that he was not entitled to double recovery. See D.E. 192 at 68 n.58. As an affirmance on the equal protection claim is sufficient to uphold the judgment, I do not address the Title IX claim.
