is always to be set aside when the will of the people, clearly and unmistakably ascertained, is against it. What guarantee of the maintenance of State rights could there be if the Senate was thus to be always set aside, simply because a majority of the people of the Federation desired it? Ultimately a compromise was arrived at; several of the representatives of the smaller States giving way, against their own judgments—as they said—merely to save federation. The arrangement is that each colony shall be equally represented in the Senate; and that each House shall have equal power of originating Bills, with the exception of Bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxation, the right of originating which is reserved to the House of Representatives, the popular Chamber. The Senate will not have the power of amending these appropriation or taxation Bills, but it may return them to the House of Representatives, with a message suggesting the omission or amendment of any of their provisions; and the House of Representatives may deal as it pleases with such suggestions. This is the practice which obtains between the South Australian Houses, and it has been found to work well. There was bitter opposition to its adoption in the Commonwealth's Senate, on the part of both the smaller and larger States; so that it is probably the best practice possible. Some representatives of the latter contended that the power of suggestion is virtually the power of amendment. Some representatives of the smaller States maintained, on the contrary, that it gives away everything, for the House of Representatives may toss the suggestions aside and act as it pleases. However, as I have said, it was adopted as a compromise.
Allied to this difficulty was that of securing finality in regard to any legislation on which the two Houses may be opposed. It was contended by some delegates that under
