for the battleship to notify to its associated aircraft the range of each salvo, so that when the fire of two or more vessels is concentrated on one, the aerial observer will be able to locate the position of any given salvo with certainty. There are many ways in which this might in effect be accomplished; for example, a smoke or flash signal could be fired on board the battleship at a prearranged one or two seconds' interval before the salvo is due to strike the water. The observer or airman will note the said signal and pick out the corresponding salvo from the splashes of independent fire or of salvos from other vessels, signalling in reply whether too short, too long, or right, or left, according to a pre-arranged code.
It will be quite clear from the foregoing discussion that although undoubtedly two or three ships concentrating their fire on one of the enemy may be detrimental to accurate shooting, the difficulties are such as can be met, and that with only a moderate loss of fire efficiency. Now, if the advantage shown to accrue from fire concentration, as exemplified by the n-square law, were something trifling or negligible, in comparison with the difficulties involved, then, without doubt, it might be judged that in practice the ship-to-ship combat would be the best, even when a numerical superiority exists. But the advantage of concentration as exemplified by the n-square law is not negligible or trifling, it is overwhelming, and of such a character as to entirely outweigh any objections which can be raised from the gunnery standpoint.[1] In brief, the controversy (so far as it is so) is a conflict between a fundamental principle and a matter
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- ↑ Discussing the present subject with the author, a Naval officer of high rank not only expressed the opinion that the concentration of the fire of two ships on one is impracticable under modern conditions, but further stated that if he were fighting two ships against two ships of an enemy, he would bring one of his ships into action first, and only throw the other into the fight when the fire control mechanism of the enemy, i.e., observation and fighting tops, telephones, etc., had been carried away or disabled. This view is the opposite extreme to that held and advocated by the author. In any case it is not thus that Nelson fought.
