of Parliamentary methods, it seems necessary to explain the difficulties which an independent member desiring reform has to encounter, and to show how completely, as regards India, official influences are dominant in the House of Commons ; also it is important to understand that things have gone from bad to worse since 1858, when the direct administration of India was assumed by the Crown. In theory, the Secretary of State in Council is supposed to be the servant of the House of Commons ; and in theory, he is supposed to occupy a position of judicial impartiality, as the Court of Appeal for Indian grievances. But neither of these suppositions has any foundation in fact. In point of fact, no matter which Party is in power, the Secretary of State, as a member of the Government commanding a Parliamentary majority, is not the servant but, in Indian matters, the master of the House of Commons ; and in deahng with the independent member who questions authority, he does not even affect impartiality, but comes before the House as the indignant apologist of the Department for which he is responsible. Also, he is free to treat the troublesome member with scant courtesy, because his salary is drawn by himself direct from the Indian Treasury, and no inconvenient motion can be brought forward for a reduction on the estimates. Further, as noted above, the Parliamentary situation has materially deteriorated since the days of the old East India Com- pany, because the House of Commons regarded the Company with a wholesome jealousy, as being a privi- leged monopoly ; and since the privileges were granted for a period of only twenty years, a searching enquiry into the whole system of administration was on each occasion carried out before the charter was renewed. Now this is all changed. The wholesome jealousy is dissipated ; and for more than half a century there has been no
