23-10362
C.
The last Nken factor asks “where the public interest lies.” 556 U.S. at 434 (quotation omitted). The stay applicants make three principal arguments.
First, the applicants argue that “procedural irregularity” in the court below favors relief. But the applicants do not explain why any specific alleged irregularity necessarily speaks to public (versus their own private) interest. Even if we assume away that problem, it is not clear to us, on our accelerated review, that any litigation below was irregular. And even if we assume, which we do not, that the district court or the plaintiffs departed from acceptable procedure, it’s unclear on this record that applicants have embraced “the principles of equity and righteous dealing” in the twenty-one years since the filing of the 2002 Citizen Petition. Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted) (noting that a party’s own imperfect conduct can prejudice their request for equitable relief).
Second, Danco argues that avoidance of “judicial conflict” warrants a stay given the order of an out-of-circuit district court. Comity between federal courts is a cognizable interest. See Def. Distrib. v. Platkin, 55 F.4th 486, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2022). We have every respect for fellow federal courts. But we cannot embrace an argument that would, in effect, allow the decision of an out-of-circuit district court to impel us towards “extraordinary” relief that would be otherwise inappropriate. Williams, 442 U.S. at 1311 (quotation omitted).
Third, the stay applicants warn us of significant public consequences should the district court’s order result in the withdrawal of mifepristone from the market. These consequences, the applicants say, include injury to pregnant women, to public healthcare systems, and to the sense of order that governs FDA drug approvals. But these concerns center on the district
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