By the time road construction began to gain some momentum, the annual movement of coal from the mines to markets had begun and open top railroad cars, which had been plentiful in the spring, became scarce once again. This cut into the supplies of construction materials, and many contractors were unable to complete their contracts before winter set in. When the season ended, no more than half of the 1919 road program had been realized, and only $2.7 million of the available Federal aid had been earned by the States.
The failure of the States to measure up to public expectations was widely criticized. In defense, A. K. Hirst, President of the American Association of State Highway Officials, said,
Never, I believe, since the days of early railroad development have the American people been so determined to change instantly their means of transport and not even then were they so willing to pay the cost, provided they could get the results.
What are the results they are now demanding and what are some of the problems that grow from these demands?
They are expecting the States which had no highway organizations three or even two years ago, which had done no preliminary work and in some of which hardly a mile of modern rural highway had ever been built, to create an organization full sprung from the earth (like our imaginary defensive and aggressive army was to spring) and to build instantly hundreds of miles of modern roads costing millions upon millions of dollars. In the older States in the highway game, better prepared with organizations and contractors, and with some knowledge of materials and construction conditions, they are asking us to double, triple, or quadruple our annual output of roads.[1]
The Debacle of 1920
Shutting their eyes to the obvious impossibility of performance, some States announced 1920 road programs that were even larger than those for 1919. Additional bond issues, plus the Federal aid authorized for fiscal year 1920 had, according to BPR estimates, boosted the road funds available to the States and counties to at least $663 million. A few sober voices warned of trouble ahead and advised the States to revise their programs downward to a realistic level or risk loss of public confidence.[2] Others predicted that the highway program would put unbearable strains on the national economy which was already suffering from shortages of every kind. In particular, they said the competition for labor might lead to an agricultural disaster if the farmers could not get their crops planted and harvested.
Despite the warnings, the States began advertising road projects on a massive scale early in 1920, so as to be ready for construction as soon as the weather permitted in the spring. Very soon the market for road contracts was saturated; and as contractors became loaded, bids fell off and bid prices escalated alarmingly. High-type roads that had cost $20,000 per mile before the war, and which went for $40,000 per mile in 1919, went up to $49,000 and even higher. In Pennsylvania bids ranged from $52,500 to $91,500 per mile for concrete roads.
In March 1919, the State Auditor of Ohio asked the Highway Department to hold up contract awards pending a readjustment of economic conditions after 13 contracts for 44 miles of highway were offered with only two bids received. In May, the New York State Highway Department withdrew all highway projects not already awarded to contract “until the situation shows a decided change for the better.” Also in May, the Minnesota Commissioner of Highways ordered the counties to stop letting new work and concentrate on finishing projects already under contract.
Bond interest rates began to rise early in 1920. In April the City of Pittsburgh received no bids for a proposed issue of 4½ percent improvement bonds. California was unable to sell its highway bonds because State law fixed interest at not over 4½ percent and prohibited the sale of State bonds below par. While the legislature wrestled with the problem, all construction and even advance planning came to a stop.
With the opening of the construction season, other troubles developed in abundance. Contractors who had taken contracts anticipating delivery of equipment in the spring sat idle waiting for the equipment. (The road equipment producers were themselves having labor and materials problems and were far behind on their orders.) Open top railway cars became scarce early in the season because of construction demand, and not enough cars were available for hauling coal, causing localized coal famines. Because of coal shortage, some of the portland cement mills reduced production, causing a shortage of cement, with contractors scrambling wildly for the available supplies at soaring prices.
The cement shortage was particularly serious to the industrial eastern and north central States, which had suffered the most damage from heavy trucking during the war. They were convinced that only concrete pavements or brick surfaces on concrete bases could stand up to heavy truck traffic, and they were also dominated by the idea that their main roads should be of “permanent construction” that would “outlive the bonds.”
Delaware and Rhode Island, unable to get portland cement, changed their designs to bituminous concrete to utilize asphalt, which was still in reasonably good supply. Wisconsin, which had planned a 400-mile cement concrete road program, cut back to 200 miles.
To add to the States’ and contractors’ difficulties, the Interstate Commerce Commission in June 1920, gave the coal industry priority on open top cars, shutting down scores of road projects at the height of the construction season.
To keep going and to appease the public demand for highway construction, some States resorted to methods that would never have been countenanced in normal times. Some let contracts on a cost-plus-percentage, or cost-plus-a-fixed fee basis. Others set up force-account or day-labor organizations to do their own work. Temporary surfaces were laid on many projects in the expectation of better conditions in 1921 under which to do the final paving.[3]
When the construction season ended in December 1920, not more than one-quarter of the anticipated program had been realized, and in some States, the accomplishment was less than 20 percent. However, it was possible to salvage some consolation from what appeared to be a massive failure.
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- ↑ A. Hirst, The American Highway Problem, Public Roads, Vol. 2, No. 20, Dec. 1919, p. 6.
- ↑ Curtailed Highway Construction, Shall It Be Voluntary Or Enforced?, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 84, No. 10, Mar. 4, 1920, p. 451.
- ↑ P. Sargent, The President’s Address, Public Roads, Vol. 3, No. 32, Dec. 1920, p. 6.
