and 1941, drastically cut by Congress, were hopelessly inadequate for the job.
The only agency with sizable Federal funds that could be used quickly to build access roads was the Work Projects Administration, which was still getting about $65 million per month for unemployment work relief. Wherever possible the WPA’s efforts were channeled into defense projects. The requirement that sponsors contribute 25 percent of the project cost was waived and the nonlabor cost limit on projects was raised from $20,000 to $100,000 to permit the purchase of more materials and the use of machinery.[1] For about 5 critical months in the summer and fall of 1940 the WPA kept traffic moving and averted paralysis at dozens of defense installations. These roads were mostly upgraded local roads and not really planned to meet installation needs, but they filled the gap until Congress provided funds for more adequate roads.
Meanwhile Commissioner MacDonald tried to persuade the States to concentrate their funds on the most urgent needs of the strategic highway system. He had no direct legislative authority to do this but relied on his powers of persuasion and the authority conferred in the original Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 to approve or disapprove projects. In August 1940 MacDonald rejected the Oklahoma highway department’s entire $5 million Federal-aid program because it was scattered throughout the State with little regard for strategic needs.[2] A month later Congress, in the Federal Highway Act of 1940, gave the Commissioner of Public Roads specific authority to give priority to defense highways in approving Federal-aid projects. In an even more drastic departure from traditional Federal-aid policies, Congress also authorized the Federal Works Administrator to initiate defense projects urgently requested by the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy and to charge the cost of these projects to the Federal-aid apportionments of the States in which they were situated.
This Act was not popular with the States, who viewed it as an attempt to make them pay for road costs that were primarily the responsibility of the national government. It provided no money for urgently needed access roads to defense establishments and, in the face of increasing civilian highway needs, actually reduced the Federal aid authorized for fiscal years 1942 and 1943. Nevertheless, most of them voluntarily concentrated a large part of their funds and other resources on the strategic network and such access roads as were on the Federal-aid system, and they also provided engineering assistance to counties for access roads not on the Federal-aid system. By October 1941, the combined Federal-aid programs of the States totaled 11,271 miles, of which 2,884 miles were on the strategic network and 197 miles were access roads. Over 40 percent of the total funds programed were directed particularly to meeting defense needs.[3]
The PRA Report on Defense Highway Needs
On June 21, 1940, President Roosevelt requested John M. Carmody, the Federal Works Administrator,
to have the Public Roads Administration . . . make a survey of our highway facilities from the viewpoint of national defense and advise me as to any steps that appear necessary.
I suggest that particular attention be paid to the strength of bridges, the width of strategic roads, adequacy of ingress and egress from urban centers, and the servicing of existing and proposed Army, Navy and Air bases.”[4]
The PRA’s report of February 1, 1941, Highways For the National Defense, disclosed an urgent need for the improvement or construction of 1,500 miles of roads entirely within military reservations and 2,830 miles of access roads to serve 192 military establishments. The estimated cost of the access roads was $220 million. The report noted that there were 2,436 substandard bridges in the strategic network and 14,000 miles of surfaces incapable of supporting 9,000-pound wheel loads in all weather. To eliminate these deficiencies would cost $458 million. The PRA recommended immediate appropriation of $150 million for access roads and at least $100 million to remedy critical deficiencies in the strategic network, the latter to be apportioned according to the traditional Federal-aid formula.
There was no immediate action on the PRA report, and it was not until June 2, 1941, that the President asked Congress to provide funds for defense highways. After extensive hearings in both Houses, Congress passed a defense highway bill which provided $150 million for access roads and $125 million to correct critical deficiencies in the strategic network to be apportioned among the States according to the Federal-aid formula.
The President vetoed this bill because of the mandatory apportionment of the strategic highway funds among the States, which, he said prevented the Administration from placing the funds where they were most needed. The veto did not escape criticism. The Engineering News-Record observed that the President had in the past made repeated attacks on the apportionment of Federal-aid funds among the States. The veto, it declared, “is a step toward complete Federal control over Federal contributions to state highway work, which appears to be the President’s objective.”[5]
Congress bent a little but did not entirely accede to the President’s wishes. Three months after the veto, it passed a practically identical bill, with the strategic highway funds scaled down to $50 million of which half were to be apportioned according to the Federal-aid formula and half could be allocated anywhere on the network at the discretion of the Federal Works Administrator. The matching ratio on these funds was to be 75 Federal to 25 State. The $150 million of access road funds in the bill did not have to be matched, but initiation of projects was left to the Government rather than the States.[N 1] The President signed this bill November 19, 1941.
- ↑ Congress authorized the appropriation of an additional $100 million for defense access roads in 1942 and a further $25 million in 1944.
War Traffic Pounds the Highways
The Defense Highway Act cleared the way for a tremendous highway effort. In October 1941, the PRA began construction of a vast network of express highways in Arlington County, Virginia, to funnel 50,000 workers into the huge Pentagon Building under
144
- ↑ WPA Mobilization For Defense Starts, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 124, No. 24, Jun. 13, 1940, p. 829.
- ↑ PRA Demands Defense Priority For Federal-Aid Work, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 125, No. 10, Sept. 5, 1940 p. 307.
- ↑ Highway Needs of the National Defense, H. Doc. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 66.
- ↑ Id., p. 56.
- ↑ Editorial, Engineering News-Record, Vol. 127, No 23 Dec. 4, 1941, p. 785.
