highway officials in organizing their catch-up programs. But this was not to be. Traffic volumes recovering from their 1943 low point reached the 1941 level again in 1946, not somewhere around 1960 as perhaps wishful thinking had forecast. By 1948 they had reached the prewar trend line, having thus completely recovered in only 5 years, and the volumes continued to push vigorously upward, following almost exactly the equally unexpected surging economic growth.
To try to establish with the State legislatures the need for more funds, many highway officials reasoned that if highway planning facts were convincing to the War Production Board in allocation of critical materials, they might be equally convincing to State legislators as evidence of highway needs in their own States. Some States did use the data to develop programs for bringing the State highway systems back to reasonable service levels, hopeful of receiving legislative approval and necessary funding. But invariably they met disappointment. The programs were thought to be self-serving, that State highway needs were emphasized at the expense of county and local roads; or that they gave insufficient attention to the needs of the cities; or that the needs were overstated; or that the program would require increased tax rates. Out of this confusing and often frustrating situation came the statewide highway needs studies. The first in California, completed in 1946, set the stage for what might be called an era of such studies.
California’s postwar highway problems were perhaps the most severe of any State, stemming largely from the huge population increases during and immediately following the war. Responding to the challenge, the State legislature enacted the Collier-Burns Act, so named for its authors Senator Collier and Assemblyman Burns, the chairmen of the respective highway committees. The Act laid down conditions perceived as needed for a successful survey of highway deficiencies and which became virtually “principles” that were generally adopted by other States as they followed California’s lead.
The first “principle” the Act specified was the establishment of a legislative commission to whom the report was to be made and which could observe the procedures and conduct of the work, thereby assuring consideration of the report by the legislature.
Second, it provided for a survey of all roads and streets, not just the State highway system, so no level of government could feel that its needs were ignored.
Third, it called for the survey to be conducted by engineers from outside the State to avoid any possible inference of favoring one system or one government level over another.
Fourth, it called for a classification and grouping into systems of all roads and streets according to their functions, toward the end of assigning to the appropriate government levels the responsibility for administering and financing the improvement programs on the different systems.
Fifth, it called for estimates of cost and recommendations of programs to bring the entire network up to desirable standards.
In seeking “outside” engineering assistance, California came into agreement with the Automotive Safety Foundation (ASF). This nonprofit foundation, sponsored by the automotive and associated industries, such as oil and rubber, had been organized to work with public and other private agencies toward the improvement of highway safety. Its principal purpose was to serve as a rallying point for activity in the field of highway and traffic safety and, through educational programs, sponsorship of conferences and meetings, and financial support of projects, to mobilize resources for a concerted attack on the accident problem. It had become convinced that improvement in the engineering of the highway, not simply to produce safer designs but to relate the design standards to the function and capacity requirements of the routes, would constitute an important element in its program. In this position the Foundation received the strong endorsement of the Public Roads Administration and with the Foundation’s President, Pyke Johnson, and Commissioner MacDonald lending their strong and steady personal support, technical and financial resources from public and private sectors were deftly marshalled in an attack on specific aspects of the overall problems. Thus, the Automotive Safety Foundation, through its engineering division organized under G. Donald Kennedy, formerly Highway Commissioner of Michigan (the only elected Commissioner among the State highway administrators), undertook to serve as the engineering consultant for the California survey. This first effort led to increasing ASF involvement in highway needs studies over many years to come.
The engineers did not conduct the surveys. Basic data came from the highway planning surveys or, where more data were needed, they were collected by the States, counties or cities as required. The engineers, with the aid of technical committees representing the various levels of government, developed standards against which street and highway adequacy might be judged. Cost estimates were prepared for needed improvements to attain the agreed upon standards, estimates of revenue were made, and from the mass of data, construction programs were prepared. Usually alternatives were proposed to show the governmental units responsible for the various systems what would be required to “catch up” with needs in periods of 10, 15 or 20 years, so the State legislature and other governing bodies could choose how rapidly they might or could bring their roads and streets to adequacy. Through the whole process, the legislative commission could observe the work as it progressed, and, thus, both political and technical leaders had had a part in the preparation of the report.
Here perhaps a word on the meaning of “highway needs” is in order. The phrase has become a part of our vocabulary, as shown by legislation at both Federal and State levels. The term is unfortunate perhaps in that it may lead to criticism that what has been proposed is not to satisfy “needs” but “desires,” and the forecast of “needs” is a self-fulfilling forecast in that if a highway is built it will be used, and thus the “need” demonstrated. Actually in the highway needs studies, two sets of standards were generally used, one called "tolerable" and the other “desirable.”
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