Page:America's Highways 1776–1976.djvu/295

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The Interstate System was examined mile by mile for the first time since its designation to measure its deficiencies. Inadequate widths, excessive grades and curvatures, short sight distances and especially weak or narrow bridges and narrow tunnels were recorded, and estimates made to bring all deficient sections, using the standards recommended for the Interstate System in Interregional Highways, up to adequacy for 1948 traffic.

Just why the study estimated the cost to meet the requirements of 1948 traffic while recognizing the continuing increase in traffic volumes and truck weights is not stated, but perhaps because the Congress gave no specific year in the future to which to direct the estimate. In any event, the estimate totaled $11.2 billion, about half to correct deficiencies in rural areas and half in cities of population above 5,000. In estimating the cost at 1948 price levels, it was noted that prices might well decline in the years ahead, again reflecting the still persisting “depression psychology.” The report further recommended that the system be brought to adequacy in no more than 20 years, which indicated an annual program of not less than $500 million. And then in 1968 it would be adequate only for 1948 traffic. But this proposed program, seemingly a “too little-too late” endeavor, must be viewed in light of the fact that at that time improvements by the States on the Interstate System were totaling only about $75 million annually, and the report recommended nearly a sevenfold program increase. It further recommended that a much more rapid improvement program would be reflected in economic and social benefits as well as meeting defense needs more quickly and proposed consideration of advancing the rate of construction by a bond issue. And it definitely proposed that the Federal participation in projects on the Interstate System should be raised above the 50 percent State-Federal matching figure. Other recommendations proposed a revolving fund for emergency construction not only for military emergencies, but for civil disasters as well, and authorization to acquire and stockpile critical materials.

While the authorizations for regular Federal aid were increasing somewhat in each biennial act (the Congress had by then indicated an informal linkage between authorization level and the revenue from the Federal motor-fuel tax), no specific provision was made by the Congress for accelerating work on the Interstate System until $25 million was authorized for each year 1952 and 1953. In the 1954 Act a somewhat more liberal provision was made by authorizing $175 million for that year and 1955. It apportioned the funds somewhat differently, half on the basis of primary system apportionments and the other half on the basis of State population. In addition it changed the matching ratio to 60 percent Federal, 40 percent State. So if Commissioner MacDonald’s recommendation of $500 million annual authorization, made in 1949, now seems low, it took the Congress 5 years to come up to one-third of that level.

There were probably two reasons, at least, for the apparent reluctance of Congress to press ahead on improving the Interstate System. First the States, with limited funds (the highway needs studies had yet to yield much fruit) and with deficiencies on all roads, were reluctant to apply funds to the Interstate System on which the design standards were much higher than on other roads and where much less mileage per dollar could be produced. In fact, many States were strongly opposed to the “high” standards. The other reason was the general pressure for more attention to secondary and farm-to-market roads, with the rural strength in State legislatures and in the Congress always evident.

The second reason is given visibility by a letter of May 27, 1949, from the Committee on Public Works of the Senate to Commissioner MacDonald, asking for a report on the condition of rural local roads. This report The Local Rural Road Problem was submitted to Congress in January 1950 and offered little support for the advocates of more aid for local roads.

Calling on the road inventory and traffic volume and classification data from the highway planning surveys, detailed studies were made of rural road service in all States. Such items as the extent of road surfacing; the distances of rural residents from all-weather roads; the road usage (from the road use studies) of rural roads by farmers and other rural residents; the average traffic volumes; the adequacy of schoolbus and mail delivery routes; the motor vehicle ownership; and the social functions permitted by the road system were studied.

With the aid of State and county engineers, estimates were made of the cost to bring the entire network up to acceptable standards. And finally the question of highway finance and administration were studied.

In capsule summary, it was found that funds allocated to local rural roads in 1947 amounted to $834,976,000—4 percent from Federal sources, 56 percent from State sources and 40 percent from local sources. Local support had dropped steadily to that level from 81 percent in 1927, with reason to believe the trend toward increasing support from the higher government levels would continue. Against this amount of available funds was an estimate of annual construction, maintenance and administrative costs of $894 million to reach adequacy for the entire network in 20 years. The gap between revenue and program costs in 1947 was only $60 million with evidence that the revenue was steadily increasing. In the same year that $835 million was being applied to local roads, the amount applied to all State primary and secondary roads was only about $1.4 billion.

The report concluded local rural roads were not only in good shape relative to roads in the other system, they were in good shape in absolute terms in that funds in sight were sufficient to put the whole system in acceptable condition. The report also concluded that local road administration was generally inefficient because the many small units were unable to own and operate suitable equipment or to retain competent engineering staffs, and it recommended consolidation of local units and close cooperation between State, county and local officials in carrying on the county and local road programs.

If the Congress and the State legislatures were apathetic with respect to improving the Interstate System, the automobile driving public was not. If better roads were not to be provided through the usual procedures, other means were sought, and the

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