136 Rcvicii's of Books condemned out of the mouths of their enemies. The style of the work is sufficiently forcible, and without doubt the volume will prove interesting as well as instructive to the general reader, as the author hoped. Properly used it may be made serviceable as a te.t-book. It remains to be added that Professor Sears makes no claim to original investigation. He has made wide use of standard authorities and magazine articles, and has usually worked over his material with care. The book ends with a use- ful bibliography of twenty-three pages. Edmund C. Burnett. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. By Hereford B. George, Fellow of New College, Oxford. (London ; T. Fisher Unwin ; New York: New Amsterdam Book Co. 1899. Pp. xvi, 451.) This handsome volume, whose paper, type, maps and general get-up need no praise, is a distinct addition to the discussion of the downward course of the greatest man of modern times. Having read his authorities conscientiously, but rejecting some valuable testimony, Mr. George relies •mainly on Chambray, Jomini and Clausewitz, all of whom served through the 18 1 2 campaign, on Buturlin, the Russian official historian, and on Napoleon's correspondence. Secure of his facts, he gives us an easily understood narrative of the campaign ; while, writing for an English audience, he naturally lays more stress on Napoleon's desire to "make war on England on the Vistula " than perhaps the true perspective of his- tory warrants. "It was Napoleon's intense desire to crush England which took him to Moscow," says he. The main cause of Napoleon's antagonism to Russia seems to our author to have been its failure to lay an embargo on English goods ; and with honest British spirit, when quoting bulletins or letters, he lays undue stress upon the Emperor's " mendacity." The unwilling vassalage of Prussia and the reluctant aid of Austria, as well as their secret anti-French understanding, are much dwelt upon, and the promises held out to Poland to secure its aid : yet these countries were allies on whom Napoleon had a right, from a military standpoint, to count. That Napoleon could hold together the motley host of 630,000 men with which he advanced on Russia, was due, Mr. George maintains, to his admirable corps commanders — but these men were strictly of Napoleon's creation. The Emperor's projecting half a million men into a country so sparsely settled that it could scarce sustain an invading army of 50,000 was an ex- periment which earlier in life he would not have undertaken, or into which he would have infused so much more of his own individuality that he might have succeeded. But he was no longer the slim, nervously active, omnipresent man ; he was corpulent, liked his ease and shunned bad weather. Except for the migratory invasions of peoples, no such force had ever yet been put into one campaign. Alexander had com- manded not more than 135,000 men ; Hannibal 60,000 ; Cassar So, 000, and Gustavus less; while Frederick rarely saw 50,000 men in one body
