States took a more positive turn as was shown, not only by the decided stand against European intervention in the affairs of the island, but also by efforts to acquire it by purchase. This tendency to the acquisition of Cuba reached its height during the somewhat stormy mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, who, being a Frenchman by birth, might with advantage have taken note of Talleyrand's maxim regarding the danger of "trop de zèle" in diplomacy. The remarkable proclamation of Soulé, Mason and Buchanan known as the Ostend Manifesto went so far as to announce in hysteric terms that the United States would be justified "by every law, human and divine, in wresting the island from Spain," should that government be indisposed to accept the §120,000,000 suggested by these gentlemen as the maximum price. The Civil War brought to an end the agitation for the purchase of Cuba, which was mainly in the interest of the South and entangled with the slavery question. Since the war, the only Cuban problem, but a serious one, thrust upon the attention of the government has been the attitude to be adopted during the insurrections in the island, and the complications, such as the Virginius affair, resulting therefrom. The problem has been finally solved. The ultimate destiny of the island is dismissed by the writer as too problematical to fall within the scope of this volume.
In discussing the proposed Central American Canal, to which a chapter is devoted. Professor Latané reviews the negotiations with Nicaragua regarding a canal through that country, the conclusion of the treaty of 1S4S with New Granada by which the United States guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, and gives as much attention as his space will allow to the history of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty—an attention which it well merits in view of the confusion existing in the minds of many honorable persons regarding the binding force of that treaty. Of the style and method of the negotiations conducted by Messrs. Blaine and Frelinghuysen in order to secure the abrogation of the treaty, anything but a high opinion is expressed. Mr. Blaine in his celebrated circular of July, 1881, to the American representatives abroad, outlining the policy of American control of an inter-oceanic canal, completely and inexplicably ignored the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and exposed himself to a summary reply from Lord Granville simply calling attention to its existence. Professor Latané justly maintains that the neutralization of the canal is the only proper method of effectively providing for its safety. Before the case of the Suez Canal should be cited as a precedent, as is done by the author, it would be well to have a somewhat clearer conception of just what the present attitude of the English government is towards the Constantinople Convention of 1883, providing for the neutralization of the canal, in view of the reservation regarding that convention made some years ago by Mr. Curzon in the House of Commons, when parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The two remaining chapters of the work treat respectively of "French Intervention in Mexico" and the "Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine." In the former, the agreement between England, France and
