5S4 Rez'iezvs of Books Oberholtzer reviews them very fully, devoting more than one-third of the book to different phases of the subject. The matters in regard to which such a vote is taken are of endless variety, but the author makes it appear very clearly that, until the recent imitation of Swiss methods, the Refer- endum, both general and local, (and for that matter the Initiative as well) was confined to definite questions determined beforehand by law. In his chapter on the Initiative, Mr. Oberholtzer points out the cur- ious fact that it has been found necessary, especially in the case of efforts to change the county seat, to restrain the use of the Initiative by allow- ing petitions for the purpose to be presented only at long intervals, by requiring a large number of signers, and by insisting on a guarantee against pecuniary loss to the community. This remark leads naturally to the only general criticism — if it be a criticism — that we have to make on the book. The work is devoted to a study of the legal provisions for the Referendum, and tells us little of its actual results. The author does indeed point out the smallness of the vote cast, and the common tendency of the people to vote for or against all the questions presented at one time without discriminating much be- tween them. But except for this, there are only scattered references here and there to particular votes, with nothing in the nature of an attempt to collect or tabulate the results. The Referendum and the Initiative in the Swiss form have, indeed, been adopted here too recently to make their use of any consequence as yet, but in the native form, which Mr. Oberholtzer thinks decidedly the best suited to our condition, the Refer- endum has existed for a long time, and a general collection of statistics concerning its effects might be highly valuable. Perhaps he may at some time in the future complete his subject by doing this work. If so, he may feel assured that we shall be even more grateful to him than we are today. A. Lawrence Lowell. English Common Laiv in the Early American Colonies. By Paul S.A.MUEL Reinsch, Ph.D., LL.B., Assistant Professor of Politi- cal Science in the University of Wisconsin. (University of Wis- consin. 1899. Pp. 64.) The ordinary theory of the courts regarding the beginnings of the common law in America is, of course, that the early settlers brought it with them as a birthright (so far as applicable to their conditions) and looked upon it from the first as a positive system wherever not replaced by colonial enactment. Such a statement, Dr. Reinsch rightfully contends, is historically incomplete and inaccurate. The points he urges in modifi- cation may be summed up as follows : ( i ) When the early settlers did refer to their inheritance in the common law, they had in mind only cer- tain general principles of personal liberty, not the highly complex and technical English system ; (2) in New England in particular there was a considerable period in which the common law was not consciously re-
