Quotations from the following authors will suffice to justify this statement. In his recent text- book (p. 210) Angell writes: "The content of our thought is, so far at least as concerns the knowledge process, always made up of imagery." This position may perhaps be taken as the generally accepted view. Some writers, however, like Dewey hold that "every mental state is as an existence, an image." (Psychology, p. 204.) While not expressly stating such a view, Titchener at least implies in his Outlines of Psychology that an image peripherally or centrally aroused conditions every state of consciousness. Opposed to this view there is a small but vigorous group of writers whose position is well represented by Stout, Woodworth and Biihler. Stout argues, in his Analytic Psychology (Vol. I, p. 80), that imagery does not accompany the use of words in ordinary discourse. His reasons are that inasmuch as introspection fails to detect such images there should be "strong positive ground for assuming their presence." In the Bericht iiber den II Kongressfiir experimentelle Psychologic (p. 264), Biihler states his position thus: "Welches sind die Bestandstiicke der Verschriebenen Denkerlebnisse? Antwort: Vorstellungen aller Art, aller Sinnesgebiete, Sach- und Wortvorstellungen, aber ausser ihnen viel häufiger, reicher und mannigfaltiger andere Gebilde, die am häufigsten als Gedanken, oder in Anlehnung an Marbe und Ach, als Bewusstseinslagen oder Ueberzeugung bezeichnet wurden. Es zeigt sich, dass man Vorstellungen und Gedanken im allgemeinen ganz sicher auseinander zu halten vermag."
After quoting from his own introspections and from those of others under experimental conditions, reporting an absence of imagery, Woodworth goes on to say (J. Phil., Psy. and Sc. Meth., Vol. 3, p. 705) that it is necessary to assume the existence of conscious elements not reducible to sensory terms and that these elements must be looked upon not as "syntheses of sensory qualities, but simply and purely the qualities of particular thoughts. ' '
It will be seen from the above that with reference to the existence of the image in the various mental processes psychologists are divided into at least three camps. (1) A group of writers holding that absolutely every state of consciousness implies the presence of imagery; (2) Another group insisting that at least all cognitive processes demand the presence of sensory imagery; (3) A group boldly declaring that even the cognitive processes are or may be carried on without the presence of a sensory or ideational image for every thought item in the process.
What now is the status of opinion when one narrows the field of inquiry to the mental processes that condition voluntary
