tributed powers of regulating commerce, of enforcing police regulations, of sanctioning and interpreting and enforcing contracts, etc., seem to the uninitiated to furnish easy means of nullifying the popular will as expressed in the laws. It is hard for the ordinary man to understand that a railroad corporation is not held to be above the law-making power, when a state law regulating railroads within the state is declared unconstitutional by a United States court, on the ground that the law is a regulation of commerce. Yet, in spite of such afflictions to the lay mind, the accepted rules of law are sufficiently explicit to leave no proper doubt that in theory corporations are held to be accountable to the people for their stewardship of public trusts.
For example: It has been held (Ohio and Miss. R. R. Co. vs. McClelland, 25 Ill., 140) that a "corporate charter, though a contract, is subject to the power of the state to regulate the action of the corporation as it would that of a natural person by proper police regulations."[1]
In the case: Peoria and Rock Island R. R. Co. vs. Cool Valley Mining Co. (68 Ill., 489) the doctrine was announced that the primary object of such corporation was the public accommodation, and promotion of public interests; that the dividends of stockholders are incidental.[2]
A single reference may be made to the claim that a charter, being a contract, may defy legislation. Judge Cooley has written as follows:[3]
"But even the agreement of a state that the grant shall be exclusive cannot prevent the making of another, subject to the obligation to provide compensation, under the principles governing the law of eminent domain. An exclusive privilege only gives to the franchise additional value as property, and all property is subject to be taken and appropriated to public uses on making payment therefor. Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an exclusive grant to construct a railroad between two named places, or a bridge
