Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 10.djvu/224

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212 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

tion, the cell may be taken as the unit. In any case, we speak of the constituent units or parts, and the constituted unity or whole.

The idea of end is in some way involved in every sort of unity. It might, at first, seem that in the unity of a pebble there is no idea of end. But why does the pebble come into consciousness at all? Why does one distinguish it from the rest of the situation and give it an identity of its own? Evidently this is done only with reference to using it as a means toward some end. Of course, one may see and distinguish a pebble without at the time having any definite end in view, but, in general, the concept through which it is apperceived is developed through situations in which an end is present in consciousness. There would be no need for the concept "pebble" nor for the perception of a par- ticular pebble, were it not for some end. It is perfectly clear, however, that the end in this case lies outside of the unity itself, and consequently that, when we take a deeper view of it, it loses its wholeness, becoming a mere part, a means to some conscious end.

It is only as we ignore ourselves and our purposes as a part of the situation that the pebble can be thought of as a whole. We are able to ignore the purpose just because, for the time being, it is assumed as fixed. Attention is concentrated upon the instru- ment or means, because that is to be selected. If, however, we are to get any real meaning for the unity as means, we must relate it to the purpose, thus making it an element in a situation, and not a whole in and of itself.

Likewise the unity of a machine lies in the end for which it is designed; and the end is outside of itself and in some conscious individual. The machine differs from the pebble in that, on the side of origin, there is a larger element of conscious purpose. It not merely subserves some end, but it was made for the purpose of subserving an end. To the degree, therefore, that a machine represents more of purpose in its origin, more of conscious adaptation and specialization in its utility, it represents a higher grade of unity than the pebble.

A plant has a higher grade of unity than a pebble or a machine. It is like them, howev.er, in that its end lies outside of