22 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
wife's to an experiment with one father only, our marriage customs and prejudices will stand as sternly in the way as if no selection had been exercised at all in the first instance. Eugenics under such limitations lose their interest and relapse into mere Platonic speculation.
I am afraid we must make up our minds either to face a considerable shock to vulgar opinion in this matter or to let eugenics alone. Christianity began by attacking marriage ; and though the attack utterly failed, the Catholic church still regards the marriage of a priest as an abomination. Luther would never have dared to marry a nun if his opinions on the question had not gone much farther than any Protestant community now dares to hint. But a merely negative attitude toward marriage is foredoomed to failure. Celibacy is so clearly an impossibilist doctrine that even St. Paul could not press it to its logical con- clusion. Luther's views are anarchic, and suggest mere profligacy to the ordinary Philistine. Now, marriage is profligate enough in all conscience ; but it is not anarchic. Consequently marriage holds its own in spite of the revulsions of the higher sexual conscience against the open claim of married people to be exempt from all social obligation and even self-respect in their relations with one another. And as this very licentiousness serves the all-important purpose of keeping the race recruited, it has never been possible to challenge it seriously until the popularization, about thirty-five years ago, of the sterilization of mar- riage. This practice had, for decency's sake, to justify itself as a eugenic one : it was said that when there were fewer children each child would receive more care and nourishment, and have a better chance of surviving to maturity. But a mere reduction in the severity of the struggle for existence is no substitute for positive steps for the improvement of such a deplorable piece of work as man. We may even allow, without countenancing for a moment the crudities of neo- Darwinism, that it may conceivably do more harm than good. What we must fight for is freedom to breed the race without being hampered by the mass of irrelevant conditions implied in the institution of marriage. If our morality is attacked, we can carry the war into the enemy's country by reminding the public that the real objection to breeding by marriage is that marriage places no restraint on debauchery as long as it is monogamic, whereas eugenic breeding would effectually protect the mothers and fathers of the race from any abuse of their relations. As to the domestic and sympathetic function of marriage, or even its selfishly sexual function, we need not interfere with that. What we need is freedom for people who have never seen each other before, and never intend to see one another again, to produce children under certain definite public conditions, without loss of honor. That freedom once secured, and the con- ditions defined, we have nothing further to say in the matter until the necessarily distant time when the results of our alternative method of recruiting will be able to take the matter in hand themselves, and invite the world to reconsider its institutions in the light of experiments, which must, of course, in the meantime run concurrently with the promiscuity of ordinary marriage.
BY JOHN M. ROBERTSON.
1. A difficulty at once arises on the proposition that " the aim ot eugenics is that each class or sect should be represented by its best specimens." What does this mean? Apparently (judging from the context) that the average of each recognizable type should be raised, that those who are now " best " should be the standard for the future averages. If that be the idea, the formula had better run simply : " The aim of eugenics is to promote such calculation or choice in marriage as shall maximize the number of efficient individuals." There will always be s<tme " best," and it is a contradiction in terms to say that they " repre- sent their class."
2. It seems, again, an oversight to make a multiplication of " large and thriving families" the ostensible ideal. If nil families were "large," they cer- tainly could not all be " thriving." A great increase of population would make thriving a harder matter ; the struggle would be intensified on new lines. Fur- ther, " thriving " is often a matter of the possession of unsocial or antisocial
