fect is produc'd by it. 'Tii usual for Men, in such Difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible, intelligent Principle, (quasi Deus ex machina) as the immediate Cause of that Event, which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common Powers of Nature. But Philosophers, who carry their Scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive, that, even in the most familiar Events, the Energy of the Cause is as unintelligible as in the most extraordinary and unusual, and that we only learn by Experience the frequent Conjunction of one Object with another, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like Connexion betwixt them. Here then many Philosophers think themselves oblig'd by Reason to have recourse, on all Occasions, to the same Principle, which the Vulgar never appeal to but in Cases, that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge Mind and Intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original Cause of all Things, but the immediate and sole Cause of every Event, that appears in Nature. They pretend, that those Objects, which are commonly denominated Causes, are in Reality nothing but Occasions; and that the true and direct Principle of every Effect is not any Power or Force in Nature, but a Volition of the supreme Being, who wills, that such particular Objects should be for ever conjoin'd with each other. Instead of saying, that one Billiard-Ball moves another, by a Force, which it has deriv'dfrom
